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NETWORK NEUTRALITY AND THE FALSE 
PROMISE OF ZERO-PRICE REGULATION 
C. Scott Hemphill
† 
This Article examines zero-price regulation, the major distinguishing 
feature of many modern “network neutrality” proposals. A zero-price rule 
prohibits a broadband Internet access provider from charging an application 
or content provider (collectively, “content provider”) to send information to 
consumers. The Article differentiates two access provider strategies thought to 
justify a zero-price rule. Exclusion is anticompetitive behavior that harms a 
content provider to favor its rival. Extraction is a toll imposed upon content 
providers to raise revenue. Neither strategy raises policy concerns that justify 
implementation of a broad zero-price rule. First, there is no economic 
exclusion argument that justifies the zero-price rule as a general matter, given 
existing legal protections against exclusion. A stronger but narrow argument 
for regulation exists in certain cases in which the output of social producers, 
such as Wikipedia, competes with ordinary market-produced content. Second, 
prohibiting direct extraction is undesirable and counterproductive, in part 
because it induces costly and unregulated indirect extraction. I conclude, 
therefore, that recent calls for broad-based zero-price regulation are mistaken. 
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The modern debate about regulatory policy in telecommunications elicits 
a powerful sense of déjà vu. Recent proposals for “network neutrality” 
regulation echo and invoke common carriage, the regulatory regime often 
applied to railroads, telecommunications, and other infrastructural industries. 
The central requirement of common carriage is that the carrier must offer its 
services in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
1 Network neutrality, like common 
carriage, responds to a concern that the owner of a bottleneck facility—here, a 
broadband Internet access provider—will discriminate among users of the 
facility in a socially undesirable fashion.
2 The users at issue are a wide range of 
content and application providers, from YouTube and Yahoo to firms such as 
Vonage that provide telephone service over a broadband connection, users that 
I refer to collectively as “content providers.” 
The analogy to common carriage, however, is imperfect. Network 
neutrality departs from the traditions of common carriage in an important 
respect. Many (though not all) network neutrality proposals share a distinctive 
feature, what I call a zero-price rule. A zero-price rule prohibits an access 
provider from charging content providers to send information to consumers.
3 
For example, access provider AT&T may not charge video content provider 
YouTube for access to AT&T’s customers, even if AT&T makes the same 
1 For an introduction to nondiscrimination norms in common carrier regulation, see Joseph D. 
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1323, 1330-40 (1998). For arguments that network neutrality is simply a replay of common 
carriage, see infra note 18 and accompanying text. 
2 For a useful summary of the debate, see Jon M. Peha et al., The State of the Debate on 
Network Neutrality, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 709 (2007). 
3 The content provider makes payments for transport but makes no incremental payment to the 




offer to YouTube rivals such as iFilm. A zero-price rule has significant 
economic consequences due to the emergent capacity of an access provider to 
control the ability of content providers to reach broadband customers.
4 
Requiring a uniform, zero price exceeds the restrictions of common carriage, 
which tolerates some forms of price discrimination in which an offer available 
to one purchaser is also available to others. 
This Article poses and answers a single question: can zero-price 
regulation of broadband access providers be justified on economic grounds? 
The first step of the analysis is to distinguish two access provider strategies that 
might justify the rule. These strategies are not unique to broadband access 
providers, but are available generally to any provider of a platform—that is, a 
foundational technology such as broadband access, the electric grid, or a video 
game console, used in combination with particular complementary applications 
to deliver value to consumers.
5 The analysis presented here thus provides 
insight into the broader question of optimal regulation of platforms. 
The first platform strategy is exclusion, actions taken to impair an 
application’s success relative to its rival. For example, in exchange for 
compensation from YouTube, AT&T might favor YouTube over iFilm in order 
to induce iFilm’s exit. The second strategy is extraction: a platform’s threat of 
exclusion, made to all applications in order to expropriate a share of application 
profits. For example, AT&T might insist upon payments from both YouTube 
and iFilm in exchange for premium access. 
Both exclusion and extraction rely upon the platform’s ability to control 
access to its consumers, but differ in the use to which that power is put. A 
platform’s incentive to extract, unlike its incentive to exclude, is premised upon 
application success, because successful applications present a larger 
opportunity for extraction. Extraction entails a threat of exclusion, but the 
threat is unlikely to be implemented because the parties will reach a bargain 
instead. Extraction is a form of private taxation that aims to raise revenue, 
rather than—as with exclusion—taxation to deter disfavored behavior. 
Although the separation is imperfect, exclusion is a preoccupation of antitrust 
policy. Extraction is not generally a subject of antitrust, but it is a central 
concern of innovation policy because the transfer of resources from 
4 See FTC,  BROADBAND  CONNECTIVITY  COMPETITION  POLICY 30-31 (2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT] (describing 
packet inspection and “flow classification” technologies that enable inferences about packet type and 
source); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC  CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNET  TRAFFIC 
PRIORITISATION:  AN  OVERVIEW (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/63/ 
38405781.pdf (discussing tools to inspect packets, discern their type, and prioritize their delivery). 
5 For related definitions of a platform, see Timothy F. Bresnahan & Shane Greenstein, 
Technological Competition and the Structure of the Computer Industry, 47 J. INDUS. ECON. 1 (1999); 
Annabelle Gawer & Rebecca Henderson, Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary 
Markets: Evidence from Intel, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1 (2007); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean 
Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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applications to the platform may alter the prospective incentives of each to 
invest in innovation. 
One contribution of this Article is to untangle exclusion and extraction as 
distinct bases for zero-price regulation. These differences are frequently 
ignored, producing an unfortunate conflation of justifications for regulation. 
Separating the two permits a reframing of the key question: to what extent do 
exclusion or extraction concerns justify the imposition of a zero-price rule upon 
access providers? To answer that question, the present analysis focuses 
attention on key elements of industry economics, such as fragmentation in the 
access provider market, nonfinancial incentives to develop content, and market 
interactions among content providers, consumers, and access providers that 
undo the effect of a regulatory intervention. 
An initial result is that exclusion concerns provide no general justification 
for a zero-price rule. Much anticompetitive exclusion is already prohibited by 
existing antitrust law. To the extent that antitrust law as currently enforced 
successfully identifies and remedies exclusion, there is less need for a new 
layer of regulatory intervention. A zero-price rule is also overinclusive, relative 
to concerns about exclusion. Thus advocates who rely upon exclusion to justify 
broad zero-price rules are mistaken. 
There is a relatively stronger argument for zero-price regulation, however, 
in the narrower case of socially produced content—that is, content such as the 
online encyclopedia Wikipedia, produced when individuals collaborate without 
anticipation of financial reward.
6 Socially produced content raises distinctive 
issues for regulatory policy where such content competes with ordinary market-
produced content. For example, Wikipedia vies with market competitors such 
as Encyclopedia Britannica for the attention of broadband customers. Exclusion 
of social production is a source of inefficiency that antitrust law is unlikely to 
remedy. Reducing that inefficiency is a possible, albeit narrower mission for 
zero-price regulation. 
Extraction concerns fare no better, in general, as a justification for a zero-
price rule. Zero-price rules have a serious practical problem. Although an 
access provider is prohibited from charging content providers, it is free to 
charge consumers under the leading network neutrality proposals. As a result, 
the access provider may charge the consumer for premium service—prompt 
delivery of video, for example—in the expectation that the content provider, in 
turn, will compensate the consumer for the extra expense. When indirect 
extraction replaces (prohibited) direct extraction, private bargaining tends to 
undo the effect of the government regulation. The shift to indirect extraction 
also imposes a social cost, making a ban on direct extraction not only 
ineffective, but counterproductive as well. 
6 See  YOCHAI  BENKLER, THE  WEALTH OF NETWORKS:  HOW  SOCIAL  PRODUCTION 




Extraction is a doubtful basis for a zero-price rule for other reasons. 
Internet content is often developed for reasons other than the expectation of 
profit. To the extent that nonfinancial motivations spur content development, 
extraction matters less for content development than is generally assumed. 
Moreover, consumer usage of broadband service may create significant benefits 
that are not captured by the access provider or content provider. An access 
provider strategy to charge content providers, while subsidizing consumers 
with low financial willingness to pay, could increase adoption and thereby 
increase these benefits. This attractive strategy is forbidden by a zero-price 
rule. In sum, neither exclusion nor extraction concerns justify a broad zero-
price rule. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I defines a zero-price rule, 
distinguishes exclusion- and extraction-based justifications for zero-price 
regulation, and identifies several harms that have resulted from the conflation 
of these justifications. Part II considers and rejects exclusion as a justification 
for a generally applicable zero-price rule, while identifying a stronger argument 
for narrowly focused regulation where socially produced content competes with 
market production. Part III explains why extraction concerns provide no clear 
justification for a zero-price rule.
7 
7 To focus attention on the issues discussed in the text, much is omitted. This Article is not a 
comprehensive treatment of common carriage, platform economics, or network neutrality. For example, 
I focus upon the scope of substantive prohibition but do not venture far into the relative institutional 
merits of ex ante regulation and ex post antitrust intervention. For an introduction to this debate, 
compare PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE 3-9 (1997) (advocating abolition of FCC 
and maintenance of competition through common law, particularly antitrust law), with Robert D. 
Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A Third Way on Network Neutrality, NEW ATLANTIS, Summer 2006, at 47, 
56 (advocating FCC oversight of competition). See also Joseph Farrell, Open Access Arguments: Why 
Confidence Is Misplaced, in NET NEUTRALITY OR NET NEUTERING: SHOULD BROADBAND INTERNET 
SERVICES BE REGULATED? 195, 206 (Thomas M. Lenard & Randolph J. May eds., 2006) (noting the 
difficulty of ex post antitrust intervention); Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: 
Toward a New Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 101-02 (2007) 
(favoring ex post, targeted enforcement over ex ante regulation). I mention but do not dwell upon certain 
effects of price discrimination whose applicability is contested in this context—for example, that if a 
tailored offering is prohibited, output might fall, and that price discrimination is a useful tool for 
efficiently managing congestion. Noneconomic justifications for regulation, including the First 
Amendment and equality norms, are slighted too. Compare Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On 
Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 107, 116-123 (2006) (advocating neutrality 
as means to diversify editorial control), with Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics 
of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1905-08 (2006) (opposing neutrality as interference with editorial 
discretion). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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I. Justifying Zero-Price Regulation 
A.  An Example: The AT&T Merger Condition 
In 2006, AT&T announced its plan to acquire BellSouth, the latest step in 
a continuing consolidation among local telephone companies.
8 In addition to 
providing ordinary telephone service, the merged entity possessed a substantial 
broadband access business. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
approved the deal without imposing any conditions.
9 The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), whose approval was also required, took a 
different approach. Two commissioners with a collective veto over the AT&T-
BellSouth transaction,
10 Commissioners Adelstein and Copps, obliged the 
parties to accept a network neutrality condition in December 2006. An 
examination of the merger condition and the justifications given by the FCC 
commissioners highlights a leading form of network neutrality regulation, 
namely zero-price regulation, and the disparate ends it is thought to serve. 
1.  Means: Zero-Price Regulation 
The AT&T merger condition is a zero-price rule in the sense discussed in 
the introduction. It forbids AT&T to “provide” or “sell” to content providers 
“any service that privileges, degrades or prioritizes any packet . . . based on its 
source, ownership or destination.”
11 Thus, AT&T may not sell, in addition to 
the “best-efforts” service that characterizes ordinary Internet access provision, a 
distinct high-quality offering providing access to (say) YouTube—for example, 
service with less transmission delay (“latency”) or variation in transmission 
speed (“jitter”), qualities that are useful for delivering real-time video content.
12 
Aside from prohibiting AT&T from making a premium deal with YouTube 
8 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1961-62 & n.1 (2007) (describing creation 
and consolidation of incumbent local exchange carriers). 
9 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement by Assistant Attorney General Thomas O. 
Barnett Regarding the Closing of the Investigation of AT&T’s Acquisition of BellSouth (Oct. 11, 2006), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/218904.pdf. 
10 The approval of a majority of the five-member Commission was required, and after one 
commissioner withdrew from consideration of the merger, see Jim Puzzanghera, FCC Approves AT&T 
Merger, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at C1, Commissioners Copps and Adelstein collectively held a 
blocking veto. 
11 Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Jr., Senior Vice President, AT&T Servs., Inc., to Marlene H. 
Dortch, Sec’y, FCC 8 (Dec. 28, 2006), available at  http://www.fcc.gov/ 
ATT_FINALMergerCommitments12-28.pdf [hereinafter AT&T Merger Condition]. 
12 An access provider might exercise control by blocking certain content entirely, or instead 
by altering its speed, latency, or jitter. For some types of content, only a block will have an economic 
effect. The present analysis is insensitive to the precise method used to impose the relative disadvantage, 
and ventures no view about whether blocking raises additional concerns on noneconomic grounds, such 
as the First Amendment. Cf. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (affirming FCC 




alone, the merger condition prohibits AT&T from making a premium offer 
generally available to all video content providers—that is, not only to YouTube 
but also to its rivals, such as iFilm.
13 In fact, AT&T is barred even from 
charging all content providers a uniform, fixed fee.
14 
To be clear, even if a content provider is insulated from the access 
payments that are the subject of this Article, the content provider must pay its 
own access provider for connectivity.
15 Thus, a zero-price rule imposes a zero 
price only as to the incremental charge made by the consumer’s access provider 
to connect a particular content provider with the consumer. 
The imposition of a zero, uniform price crosses the traditional boundaries 
of common carriage. Common carriage is a frequent source of analogies and 
reasoning for modern telecommunications policy.
16 Because access providers 
are not subject to common carrier rules,
17 it is natural to ask whether common-
carrier regulation should extend to access provision. Some commentators view 
network neutrality as a replay of the common carriage debate.
18 
The price uniformity implemented by a zero-price rule, however, is not a 
condition of common carriage. Common carriers have long been permitted to 
engage in price discrimination. Historically, for example, railroads have 
charged a higher price to shippers of high-value materials,
19 as part of value-of-
13 Such an offer, if accepted, would “privilege” service based upon a packet’s “source.” 
AT&T Merger Condition, supra note 11, at 8.  The condition applies to offers made to AT&T 
subsidiaries and lasts for two years or until Congress passes network neutrality legislation, whichever 
comes first. AT&T’s willingness to accept a relatively short-lived restriction may reflect a calculation 
that discrimination is not yet fully practicable. 
14 Charging a provider for basic service would once again “privilege” service based upon a 
packet’s “source.” See id. 
15 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Address at the American Enterprise Institute: Key Issues in 
Telecommunications Policy 29:50 (May 10, 2006), available at http://app2.capitalreach.com/esp1204/ 
servlet/tc?cn=aei&c=10162&s=20272&e=2921&&espmt=2 [hereinafter Lessig AEI Presentation] 
(noting content provider payments for connectivity). 
16 See generally ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983). 
17 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) 
(affirming FCC determination that cable modem access is not telecommunications service subject to 
common carrier requirements); In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853 (2005) (forbearing to impose common carrier requirements upon 
DSL broadband access providers, despite their status as a telecommunications service). 
18 See, e.g., Bruce Owen, The Net Neutrality Debate: Twenty Five Years After United States 
v. AT&T and 120 Years After the Act to Regulate Commerce 4 & n.6 (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin 
Working Paper No. 336, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963623 (describing net neutrality 
as a “semantically unnecessary term for the old ide[a] ‘common carrier access’”); Christian Sandvig, 
Network Neutrality Is the New Common Carriage, 9 J. POL’Y, REG. & STRATEGY 136 (2007); Transcript 
of  Moyers on America: The Net at Risk (PBS television broadcast Oct. 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/moyersonamerica/print/netatrisk_transcript_print.html (quoting Rick Karr, 
reporter for documentary; “The Internet version of common carriage is known as ‘network neutrality.’”). 
19 See, e.g., JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 83 (1961) (railroad 
rates vary depending upon value of commodity shipped, out of proportion to difference in cost). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 




20 Telephone companies charged higher rates to business 
customers and in large cities.
21 And highly tailored service packages for large 
business customers have been held to satisfy the Communication Act’s 
nondiscrimination rule,
22 provided the filed tariff is available to other 
customers with the same needs.
23 Common carriage merely prohibits certain 
types of unreasonable discrimination.
24 Network neutrality therefore adds an 
additional element—insistence upon a zero, uniform price—to the traditional 
regulatory principles of nondiscrimination and interconnection. 
Though not a requirement of common carriage, some regulatory regimes 
do implement a zero-price rule. The Carterfone attachment regime permitted 
independent equipment manufacturers to offer new attachments to the AT&T 
network without permission from or payment to AT&T.
25 “Must-carry” rules 
require cable television providers to carry local television broadcasts without 
payment.
26 Zero-price outcomes are implemented outside the context of 
communications as well. For example, the owners of the electric grid charge 
end users but not appliance manufacturers, though this appears to be a matter of 
technical feasibility rather than the result of any legal rule. 
A zero-price rule is a key tenet of network neutrality advocacy. Aside 
from the AT&T merger condition, it is a common feature of proposed 
legislative solutions,
27 academic advocacy,
28 and corporate lobbying by content 
20 See id. at 372 (describing Interstate Commerce Commission approval of value-of-service 
ratemaking despite discriminatory effect). One source of confusion has been use of the term 
“discrimination” to denote only actionable discrimination. Id. at 371-72. 
21 Id. at 83; 1 ALFRED  E.  KAHN, THE  ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:  PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 63-64 (1970). 
22 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000) (prohibiting “unjust or unreasonable discrimination”). 
23 For example, AT&T’s Tariff 12. See Competitive Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 998 F.2d 
1058, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[I]f the package is made available to any customer who wants it upon the 
same terms, then there is no unlawful discrimination.”); see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. ICC, 738 F.2d 
1311, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Although one normally regards contract relationships as highly 
individualized, contract rates can still be accommodated to the principle of nondiscrimination by 
requiring a carrier offering such rates to make them available to any [customer] willing and able to meet 
the contract’s terms.”). 
24 See B ONBRIGHT,  supra note 19, at 370 (only “undue” or “unjust” discrimination 
prohibited); Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common Carriage, 18 
TELECOMM. POL’Y 435, 436 (1994) (“[N]o customer seeking service upon reasonable demand, willing 
and able to pay the established price, however set, would be denied lawful use of the service or would 
otherwise be discriminated against.”) (emphasis added); id. at 438 (noting that limitations on 
discrimination are not absolute); see also James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet 
Connection, 54 FED.  COMM.  L.J. 225, 258 (2002) (noting the weakness of the nondiscrimination 
obligation at common law). 
25 Provided it meets certain minimum technical requirements. In re Use of the Carterfone 
Device in Message Toll Tel. Servs., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), reconsideration denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 
(1968). 
26 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (2000) (cable); see also id. § 338(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005) (similar for 
direct broadcast satellite operators). 
27 In early 2007, Senator Dorgan introduced the Internet Freedom Preservation Act, which 
would amend the Communications Act to impose a zero-price rule. S. 215, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) 




providers such as Google.
29 Opponents of network neutrality have identified it 
as a troubling feature of regulatory proposals.
30  
Not all network neutrality proponents insist upon a zero-price rule. Others, 
including Lawrence Lessig
31 and a senior Google executive (dissenting from 
the firm’s official position),
32 appear to accept access fees imposed upon 
content providers, provided that an offer made to one content provider is also 
extended to its rivals.
33 
application access on a basis that does not impose a charge on the basis of application type). In the 109th 
Congress, at least three bills employed a zero-price rule. Representative Sensenbrenner introduced the 
Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006, which would have amended the Clayton Act to 
require an access provider to prioritize all data of a specific type, regardless of origin of ownership, if it 
did so for any data of that type, and without charging, and to provide nonaffiliated applications with the 
same quality (again without a charge) as that provided to affiliates. H.R. 5417, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006). 
The Network Neutrality Act of 2006, introduced by Representative Markey, would have imposed a 
similar duty. H.R. 5273, 109th Cong. § 4(a)(7) (2006) (“[If a] broadband network provider 
prioritizes . . . data of a particular type, [then it must] prioritize . . . all data of that type (regardless of 
[origin]) without imposing a surcharge . . . .”). Of similar import was the Internet Non-Discrimination 
Act of 2006 introduced by Senator Wyden. S. 2360, 109th Cong. § 4(a)(3) (2006) (“[A] network 
operator shall . . . not assess a charge to any application or service provider not on the network of such 
operator for the delivery of traffic to any subscriber to the network of such operator . . . .”). 
28 FTC, Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy Workshop 259-60 (Feb. 14, 2007), 
available at  http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/broadband/transcript_070214.pdf (statement of Tim 
Wu) (arguing in favor of zero-price regulation). 
29  Posting of Richard Whitt, Washington Telecom and Media Counsel, to Google Public 
Policy Blog, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2007/06/what-do-we-mean-by-net-neutrality.html 
(June 16, 2007, 17:52 EST) (advocating ban on “surcharges on content providers that are not [the access 
provider’s] retail customers”). 
30 See, e.g., Hal J. Singer, Net Neutrality: A Radical Form of Non-Discrimination, REG., 
Summer 2007, at 36, 36; Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, The Myth of Network Neutrality and What 
We Should Do About It 8-9 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. RP06-
33, 2006), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1357. 
31 See, e.g., Lessig AEI Presentation, supra note 15, at 1:04:20 (answering, in response to 
question, that charging Google and rival the same amount would not raise application tiering issues); id. 
at 58:30 (stating that only concern is viewpoint discrimination); Lawrence Lessig, Lecture at Center for 
American Progress, The Withering of the Net: How D.C. Pathologies Are Undermining the Growth and 
Wealth of the Net 14 (June 16, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/ 
060616%20lessig%20lecture.pdf) (accepting practice where access provider charges rival content 
providers same premium price for video transport). 
32 Google Senior Policy Counsel Andrew McLaughlin distinguished zero-price regulation, 
Google’s official position, from a “more pragmatic view that it is OK [to charge] as long as it is done in 
a non-discriminatory way.” See Posting of Drew Clark to GigaOM, Is Google Changing Its Position on 
Net Neutrality?,  http://gigaom.com/2007/03/13/is-google-changing-its-position-on-net-neutrality (Mar. 
13, 2007). A Google spokesperson later reaffirmed that McLaughlin’s view differed from Google’s. Id. 
33 One observer has concluded that “[m]ost recently, network neutrality proponents have 
conceded the validity of access tiering and have simply argued for nondiscrimination within tiers.” 
Christopher S. Yoo, What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network Neutrality Debate?, 1 INT’L  J. 
COMM. 493, 518 (2007) [hereinafter Yoo, Antitrust]. No evidence is cited in support of this conclusion, 
which seems too strong given the examples discussed in this section. Such a concession by network 
neutrality advocates, moreover, implies a rejection of the AT&T merger condition, a condition that at 
least some network neutrality advocates applaud. The assertion also overlooks those advocates for 
whom a zero-price rule does not go far enough. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the 
Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359, 403-04 (2007). For them, particular types of 
content should not be singled out for high-quality access, even if the access is provided for free. That ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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2.  Ends: “Anticompetitive Discrimination” and “Toll Booths” 
Commissioner Adelstein issued a statement explaining why he had 
insisted upon a network neutrality condition, and Commissioner Copps did the 
same. Adelstein decried the parties’ incentives for “anti-competitive 
discrimination”
34 and understood the imposition of network neutrality as a way 
to prevent an access provider from acting upon that incentive. He chastised the 
Antitrust Division for what he viewed as its failure to act, and argued that the 
Division’s inactivity had made FCC action necessary.
35 Put differently, he saw 
the Division’s decisionmaking, and the FCC’s, within an antitrust frame. The 
antitrust frame Adelstein apparently had in mind is a concern about 
exclusion—to return to the earlier example, that AT&T, in exchange for 
payment, might favor YouTube over iFilm. 
Copps took a different view. For Copps, the provision’s value was to 
“ensure[]” that content providers and other Internet users “have the ability to 
reach the merged entities’ millions of Internet users—without seeking the 
company’s permission or paying it a toll.”
36 To worry about tolls is to worry 
about extraction, the use of a threat of exclusion to insist upon a share of 
content provider profits. To be sure, Copps’ statement did not rule out a 
concern about exclusion. A toll might be undesirable because the price is set so 
high that it deters a rival’s entry. “Permission,” if denied in equilibrium, 
amounts to exclusion. And Copps, like Adelstein, took the Antitrust Division to 
task for approving the merger unconditionally.
37 But Copps did not limit his 
statement to the exclusion frame, nor did his reasoning rest upon the access 
provider’s incentive to impair a particular content provider’s competitive 
prospects. 
Neither statement explained the need for a zero-price rule, rather than 
more limited regulation, or acknowledged the contrast between the two 
commissioners’ views. These omissions are unfortunate, because the 
differences matter: the two theories have different economic effects, as 
explained in the next section, and are addressed to different degrees by existing 
law. Their conflation leads to confusion in assessing proposals for new 
regulation. For example, if Adelstein is right to focus upon exclusion, then why 
isn’t the existing antitrust prohibition of exclusion, discussed in Part II, a 
sufficient policy response? Why not seek instead a provision more closely 
outcome is a plausible reading of the AT&T merger condition, which prohibits not only sale of premium 
access but, equally, “provi[sion].” 
34 See In re AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control, 22 F.C.C.R. 
5662, 5837 (2007) (Adelstein, Comm’r, concurring) (arguing that the network neutrality condition was 
implemented to “address incentives for anti-competitive discrimination”). 
35 Id. at 5836. 
36 Id. at 5831 (Copps, Comm’r, concurring). Commissioner Copps named as exemplars “[t]he 
next Drudge Report, Wikipedia, Craigslist, Instapundit, or Daily Kos.” Id. 




tailored to exclusion concerns, rather than insist upon a zero-price rule, which, 
as we shall see, prohibits much more than exclusion? On the other hand, if 
extraction concerns justify a zero-price rule, as Copps suggests, can we ignore 
exclusion (and Adelstein’s arguments) altogether? After all, a persuasive 
argument that rests upon extraction makes exclusion arguments unnecessary. 
B.  The Potential Costs of Access Control 
Skeptics suggest that network neutrality regulation is a solution in search 
of a problem.
38 The commissioners’ statements indicate two distinct problems 
to which a zero-price rule might respond. Distinguishing them, and placing 
each on a more rigorous footing, is a necessary step toward evaluating each as a 
justification for a zero-price rule. 
Both theories are premised upon the access provider’s possession of 
significant market power. The access provider market is currently a duopoly. 
Consumers buy broadband access from AT&T or another telephone company, 
or else from a cable company such as Comcast.
39 Access provision has 
declining average costs, making it difficult for a second cable company or 
second local telephone company to enter. Switching costs are significant. In the 
future, wireless or other technology may provide a third source of provision, 
but for now, the access provider controls a bottleneck. Where there are multiple 
providers, moreover, the providers are not identical rivals. There is no 
guarantee that these alternatives (or others, such as wireless service) will 
coexist in long-term equipoise. A technology with clear superiority, if it 
emerges, might tip the market toward monopoly.
40 
38 For example, Representative Bobby Rush. See Anne Broache, Tech Manufacturers Rally 
Against Net Neutrality, CNET  NEWS.COM, Sept. 19, 2006, http://www.news.com/2100-1028_3-
6117241.html. 
39 The FCC reports that nearly half of U.S. zip codes are served by either one or two ADSL or 
cable modem providers. FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 
2007, at tbl.16 (2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
280906A1.pdf [hereinafter FCC DEPLOYMENT STUDY] (reporting one such provider in 24 percent of zip 
codes, and two such providers in 22 percent of zip codes). In addition, 10 percent of zip codes reported 
no DSL or cable modem providers. The fraction of consumers, as opposed to zip codes, served at most 
by a duopoly is higher, since a provider is counted for the entire zip code even if it serves only business 
customers and even if it serves only part of the territory (as usually will be the case for multiple cable 
companies, as their territories seldom overlap). See U.S.  GEN.  ACCOUNTING  OFFICE, BROADBAND 
DEPLOYMENT IS EXTENSIVE THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE 
EXTENT OF DEPLOYMENT  GAPS IN RURAL  AREAS 16-17 (2006), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06426.pdf. Limiting consideration to DSL and cable modem is 
appropriate because these two technologies dominate the market. See FCC DEPLOYMENT STUDY, supra, 
at tbl.6. Mobile wireless has significant penetration (if included with DSL and cable modem provision, it 
would have a market share around 25 percent on a total-lines basis) but is not currently a close substitute 
for many users. 
40 I thank Mark Lemley for pointing this out to me. ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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1.  Exclusion and Reduced Competition 
An access provider with market power has, under certain circumstances, 
the incentive and ability to impair the competitive prospects of a content 
provider, in order to favor rival content in which the access provider has an 
economic interest.
41 The reduced competition in content leads to higher content 
prices for consumers and allocative inefficiency when consumer purchases are 
deflected to less desirable substitutes, as well as a productive inefficiency when 
lower-cost content is kept from the market.
42 The access provider profits from 
the reduced content competition either by owning the favored content or 
through a contractual relationship in which the content provider pays the access 
provider to exclude the rival content. 
Under certain conditions, the access provider has no incentive to exclude 
in this way.
43 It is a familiar result from platform economics that one impetus to 
exclude is missing when the application can be used only in conjunction with 
the platform—a video game that works only with a particular console, for 
example. The platform can then earn maximum profit from “captive” 
application users without taking over the application’s business. 
Internet content, however, has many nonplatform users, judged from the 
perspective of a particular access provider. The audience for iFilm’s video 
service is not limited to AT&T broadband customers. As a result, if AT&T can 
induce iFilm’s exit (or deter its entry in the first place), AT&T might 
monopolize the content market through a corporate affiliate or contracting 
partner, and earn profit not only from captive AT&T customers but also from 
noncaptive users of the content.
44 For this strategy to work, the content provider 
41 These practices are termed “vertical” because the contracting parties are at different stages 
in the chain of production or distribution, but the same arguments apply whenever the parties produce 
complements. For excellent modern accounts, see MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS 133-97 (2006); Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL  ORGANIZATION 2145 (Mark Armstrong & Rob Porter eds., 2007); Michael Riordan, 
Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Paolo Buccirossi 
ed., forthcoming Apr. 2008). 
42 If the platform owner is unable to make a binding contractual commitment to a single 
firm—because cheating is unobservable, perhaps, or the necessary contracts violate antitrust law—the 
platform may implement its commitment through vertical integration. If the vertical integration is 
inefficient, then exclusion entails a further social cost. See Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical 
Integration and Market Foreclosure, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 
205, 207-10 (1990); Rey & Tirole, supra note 41, at 2158-62. 
43 See  RICHARD  A.  POSNER, ANTITRUST  LAW 223-29 (2d ed. 2001); Aaron Director & 
Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290-93 (1956); Joseph 
Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a 
Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 100-19 (2003). 
44 An early articulation is Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 837 (1990). For a nontechnical treatment, see Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of 
Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal: Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 
659, 667-68 (2001). This is the classic “desert island” story, which Carlton attributes to Robert Gertner. 
Daniel Rubinfeld and Hal Singer applied this theory to the merger between Time Warner and America 




must face economies of scale, such as a fixed entry cost or demand-side 
network effects wherein one consumer’s valuation of the content increases with 
the number of other users. Internet content provision often satisfies that 
assumption. The access provider must also be capable of disrupting, by means 
of exclusion, the content provider’s ability to exploit scale. Whether access 
providers can deprive a content provider of scale is considered in Part II. 
Commissioner Adelstein is far from alone in relying upon exclusion 
concerns to justify a zero-price rule. Google, for example, supports the rule to 
prevent “those last-mile activities that would discriminate against certain 
Internet applications or content with an anticompetitive intent.”
45 Scholars have 
hypothesized a negative effect on competition and explored at length the 
different mechanisms by which exclusion might occur.
46 Legislative proposals 
that implement network neutrality have invoked the exclusion frame.
47 When 
network neutrality proponents describe the historical antecedents of current 
policy proposals—for example, the famous exclusive contract between Western 
Union and the Associated Press—the examples reflect exclusion concerns.
48 
Network neutrality opponents understand proponents to be arguing that 
regulation is needed in order to address exclusion,
49 prompting the response 
that exclusion is unlikely
50 and best remedied by existing antitrust law.
51 This 
the AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631 (2001) [hereinafter Rubinfeld & Singer, 
Open Access]; Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access?, 49 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 299 (2001) [hereinafter Rubinfeld & Singer, Vertical Foreclosure]. 
45 Google Public Policy Blog, supra note 29. 
46 See, e.g., Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality 
Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 333 (2007) (arguing that object of network 
neutrality is “to design rules that prevent network operators and ISPs from using their power over the 
transmission technology to negatively affect competition in complementary markets for applications, 
content and portals”) (emphasis added). 
47 For example, one bill favorably reported out of the House Judiciary Committee had as its 
announced purpose “to promote competition, to facilitate trade, and to ensure competitive and 
nondiscriminatory access to the Internet.” Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006, H.R. 
5417, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (statement of purpose). The accompanying report explained that the bill 
was designed to “preserv[e] an antitrust remedy for anticompetitive and discriminatory practices” by 
access providers. H.R. REP. NO. 109-541, at 2 (2006); see also id. at 4 (emphasizing the similarity 
between this bill and earlier antitrust interventions in the telecommunications industry, particularly the 
breakup of the Bell System). 
48 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in 
Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 28-35 (2006) (reviewing Western Union’s 
exclusive contract with the Associated Press, the Kingsbury Commitment, and Carterfone). 
49 E.g., Owen, supra note 18, at 5; Bruce Owen & Gregory Rosston, Local Broadband 
Access: Primum Non Nocere or Primum Processi? A Property Rights Approach, in NET NEUTRALITY 
OR NET NEUTERING: SHOULD BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES BE REGULATED? 163, 176 (Thomas M. 
Lenard & Randolph J. May eds., 2006) (“The commercial demand for access regulation arises from a 
fear . . . that [access providers] will themselves integrate vertically into various content, aggregation, or 
equipment businesses, and that this will be harmful to independent suppliers.”); Yoo, Antitrust, supra 
note 33; see also Shelanski, supra note 7, at 102 (characterizing network neutrality as a response to 
exclusion concerns). 
50 See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality 
Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 349, 470-71 (2006). 
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focus is unsurprising, given the longstanding centrality of exclusion as a 
concern of telecommunications policy,
52 and the focus upon exclusion in 
examining the merger of Time Warner and America Online, a notable precursor 
to the network neutrality debate.
53 
2.  Extraction and Reduced Innovation 
Even without equilibrium exclusion, an access provider can profit by 
extracting profits from the content provider.
54 The access provider does not 
bother getting into the content business because it can capture the surplus 
produced by the content provider by virtue of its status as a bottleneck. For 
example, AT&T might insist that YouTube and iFilm each pay AT&T part of 
the content provider’s profits in exchange for providing high-quality video 
transmission. Such access charges are a common practice in some industries. 
Video game console makers, for example, receive royalties from independent 
game developers. Credit card payment systems such as Mastercard and Visa 
charge merchants a transaction fee for use of the network. An extraction 
incentive is present even if the access provider has an affiliated, competing 
content provider, since each customer who uses the competing affiliated 
content, rather than the independent content, represents a foregone access 
charge.
55 
Extraction entails a threat of exclusion, but the threat is not carried out in 
equilibrium; the threat is therefore not exclusionary conduct in the usual sense. 
The profitability of an extraction strategy, as implemented by an access 
provider or other platform, is premised upon a thriving set of independent 
applications. The activity is private taxation to raise revenue, rather than to 
deter. Exclusion relies upon disfavoring one content provider relative to 
another—the raising of a rival’s costs.
56 Concerns about extraction apply, by 
contrast, even if all content providers are affected equally and none is 
favored—where it is a complementor, rather than a rival, whose costs are being 
raised. 
52 See, e.g., JONATHAN  E.  NUECHTERLEIN  &  PHILIP  J.  WEISER, DIGITAL  CROSSROADS: 
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 16-22 (2004). 
53 See Rubinfeld & Singer, Open Access,  supra note 44; Rubinfeld & Singer, Vertical 
Foreclosure, supra note 44. 
54 Extraction is consistent with the “one monopoly profit” no-exclusion result—indeed, it is 
presumed in that account. See Jean Tirole, The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer, COMPETITION POL’Y 
INT’L, Spring 2005, at 1; Whinston, supra note 44, pt.3; see also Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, 
Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 413 (2000); Farrell 
& Weiser, supra note 43, at 104 (explaining that side payments are consistent with “internalizing 
complementary efficiencies” baseline). 
55 Tirole, supra note 54, at 6. 
56 See Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 




Extraction is facilitated by effective price discrimination. That is, 
purchasers with relatively high willingness to pay and few effective substitutes 
for access provision are charged a higher price. Familiar examples include 
unrestricted airline fares and hardcover books. As discussed above, common 
carriers frequently implement price discrimination. Price discrimination 
increases the carrier’s profits, thus providing an additional means to cover fixed 
costs. Price discrimination can also help to tune allocation and production 
decisions to better correspond to demand variations among consumers.
57 
On the simplest account, extraction simply shifts resources from the 
content provider to the access provider. Google and other content providers, of 
course, have reason to support a zero-price rule even if extraction raises merely 
a distributional issue without any consequence for efficiency. In addition, 
extraction has a dynamic efficiency consequence if it alters the investment 
decisions of content providers.
58 As a theoretical matter, it may have no such 
consequence, given the access provider’s incentive to increase surplus—which 
the access provider can then extract—by ensuring high-quality content.
59 If 
there is a dynamic efficiency effect, it entails a tradeoff: reduced incentives for 
entry and investment by content providers, combined with increased incentives 
to invest in access provider infrastructure, via the contribution to fixed costs 
just mentioned. As a theoretical matter, it is not apparent which effect is larger. 
Access providers have not defended any right to anticompetitive 
exclusion, but extraction is an explicit goal. AT&T’s CEO candidly explained 
that content providers “don’t have any fiber out there. They don’t have any 
wires. They don’t have anything. They use my lines for free—and that’s bull. 
For a Google or a Yahoo! or a Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes 
for free is nuts!”
60 As Verizon’s deputy general counsel explained his 
company’s point of view: “The network builders are spending a fortune 
constructing and maintaining the networks that Google intends to ride on with 
nothing but cheap servers. It is enjoying a free lunch that should, by any 
rational account, be the lunch of the facilities providers.”
61 
57 For a thoughtful introduction to these issues, see Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 597 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); 
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Hal R. Varian, Pricing the Internet, in PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE INTERNET 
269 (Werner Sichel & Donald L. Alexander eds., 1995). Varian currently serves as chief economist at 
Google but has not joined Google’s advocacy effort in favor of network neutrality regulation. 
58 See, e.g., Gawer & Henderson, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that platform incentives to 
squeeze complementors may undermine innovation incentives). 
59 See infra Section III.D for further discussion. 
60 Spencer E. Ante & Roger O. Crockett, Rewired and Ready for Combat: SBC and Verizon 
Are Spending Billions to Stay Competitive in the Broadband Era, BUS. WK., Nov. 7, 2005, at 110. See 
also Paul Taylor, AT&T Chief Warns on Internet Costs, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at 22 (“I think the 
content providers should be paying for use of the network. . . . They shouldn’t get on [the network] and 
expect a free ride.” (quoting AT&T CEO Whitacre)). 
61 Arshad Mohammed, Verizon Executive Calls for End to Google’s “Free Lunch,” WASH. 
POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at D1 (quoting Verizon deputy general counsel John Thorne). One spokesman put 
the issue this way: “Is the only potential payer going to be the end user, the customer, or are there other ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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Extraction concerns—in particular, that extraction will reduce the 
profitability of and hence investment in independent content development—
motivate many calls for network neutrality regulation. We saw one example 
already, in Commissioner Copps’ statement about the AT&T merger 
condition.
62 Some regulation proponents appear to focus upon extraction 
concerns and deemphasize anticompetitive exclusion.
63 The same argument, 
and the reference to a “toll,” has been emphasized by academics
64 and interest 
groups.
65 As Google’s Vint Cerf, an Internet pioneer, has argued, network 
neutrality regulation ensures that “people with interesting ideas . . . [do] not 
have to leap over any kind of a hurdle to buy access to customers.”
66 One 
member of the Federal Trade Commission has framed the network neutrality 
issue explicitly in extraction terms.
67 
3. Additional  Harms 
The two previous sections present a simple dichotomy. Exclusion is bad 
because it undermines competition. Extraction is troubling if it undermines 
innovation. This dichotomy, however, does not exhaust the harms of each 
ways to finance infrastructure by asking content providers to pay as well?” Tom Abate, Speed Bumps on 
the Information Highway, S.F. CHRON., June 18, 2006, at A1 (quoting Daniel Brenner, senior vice 
president for law and regulatory policy for the National Cable and Telecommunications Association). 
62 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
63 See, e.g., Network Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, 109th Cong. 9 (2006) [hereinafter Lessig Testimony] (statement of Lawrence Lessig), 
available at  http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/lessig-020706.pdf (disclaiming reliance upon antitrust 
arguments); Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an 
Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 414 n.119 (2007) 
(explaining that network neutrality “goes beyond” antitrust reasoning by preserving high profits, and 
hence incentives, for independent content providers). 
64 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. 
POST, June 8, 2006, at A23; Lawrence Lessig, Congress Must Keep Broadband Competition Alive, FIN. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2006, at 17 [hereinafter Lessig, Congress] (identifying “internet toll booths” that 
“impos[e] a special tax”); Lawrence Lessig, I Blew It on Microsoft, WIRED, Jan. 2007, at 96 [hereinafter 
Lessig, I Blew It] (“Every dominant commercial competitor has the same incentive: to build a business 
that extracts all potential value from the pipes that company owns.”); see also Network Neutrality: 
Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Access: Hearing Before the Telecom and Antitrust 
Task Force of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) [hereinafter Wu Testimony] 
(statement of Tim Wu) (recognizing that nonneutrality amounts to a tax but likening its imposition to an 
illegal protection racket); id. at 7 (describing the problem as “nothing more than a tax”). 
65 American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU & Youth: Why We Need Net Neutrality 
Protections, http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/internet/27159res20061023.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) 
(offering “Expensive Downloads and [Podcasting]” as one of several reasons and noting that absent net 
neutrality, “network providers could charge you more to download . . . videos or music, or to use 
services such as Rhapsody, YouTube, Napster, and iTunes . . . [and] tell you which download service 
you have to use, charging you a toll if you decide to use one of their competitors”). 
66 Abate, supra note 61. 
67 See Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, FTC, Concurring Statement Regarding Staff Report: 
“Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy”  2-3  (June 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/V070000statement.pdf (arguing that “expropriat[ion]” by access 




strategy. Exclusion, aside from its static consequences for competition, can 
undermine innovation in content. The anticipation of exclusion may discourage 
prospective entrants from developing new content. This consequence of 
exclusion, however, lacks a distinctive policy implication. If exclusion imposes 
a substantial static harm, then exclusion should be prohibited even if there is no 
dynamic inefficiency. Moreover, if the dynamic harms of extraction provide a 
strong general basis for zero-price regulation, it adds little to show that 
exclusion, when and if it occurs, also has a negative dynamic effect. 
Extraction strategies can have static effects, aside from the dynamic effect 
on application innovation. Price discrimination, which is central to the 
operation of extraction, is typically executed imperfectly. A seller’s 
information and contracting technologies are ordinarily not fine-grained enough 
to perfectly target the buyer’s surplus. An application provider will engage in 
costly avoidance strategies and may pass along part of its increased expense to 
its consumers, perhaps in an inefficient fashion.
68 In addition, the platform will 
expend real resources in order to improve its technology of price 
discrimination, including inefficient decisions about “vertical integration,” the 
ownership of complementary businesses. These costs are difficult to evaluate 
and measure, one reason why the static inefficiency of imperfect extraction has 
not been a major focus of competition policy or a prominent argument for 
network neutrality proponents. 
These effects complicate but do not erase the basic dichotomy. Exclusion 
raises distinctive concerns about static welfare losses, to which antitrust policy 
is primarily directed. Extraction raises concerns about dynamic welfare losses, 
particularly with respect to independent application development, and this is a 
preoccupation of innovation policy. 
C.  The Consequences of Conflation 
Exclusion and extraction concerns raise different questions about the 
advisability of a zero-price rule. For extraction, three issues are most important. 
First, a zero-price rule might cause the access provider to effect extraction by 
other, less direct means. Second, a zero-price rule, to the extent it alters 
investment incentives, might not do so in a socially desirable fashion. Third, 
the access provider can “contract into” effective incentives for content 
development, despite its legal entitlement to extract. These questions are 
considered in Part III. 
For exclusion, two issues arise. The first is superfluity: existing antitrust 
law prohibits some forms of exclusion. Provided that antitrust law as currently 
enforced successfully identifies and remedies exclusion, there is no need for 
68 Joseph Farrell, Presentation at FTC Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy Workshop 
155 (Feb. 13, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/broadband/ 
transcript_070213.pdf) (describing this problem). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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additional regulatory intervention. The second is overinclusion. Even if new 
regulation is necessary to prevent exclusion, it need not take the form of a zero-
price rule. A zero-price rule not only prevents an access provider from 
impairing a content provider’s competitive prospects relative to a rival, but 
prevents the charging of any access fee. That is, the rule prohibits both 
exclusion and extraction, a result that is difficult to justify unless extraction 
concerns are important. 
Unfortunately, policy and academic discussions occur at a level of 
generality that subsumes exclusion and extraction arguments. Condemnations 
of access provider “discrimination” do not carefully distinguish practices that 
set different prices for different content types—a garden-variety extraction 
strategy of price discrimination
69—from practices that disfavor one content 
provider relative to its rival. Phrases that identify the desired end state, such as 
“innovation without permission,”
70 neither rule in nor rule out the imposition of 
a uniform, zero price. In this respect, at least, the network neutrality debate 
presents nothing new, for similar confusion permeates analyses of common 
carriage as well.
71 
The resulting confusion has several bad consequences. Regulatory 
proponents justify a zero-price rule as a response to anticompetitive exclusion, 
without recognizing or justifying the rule’s overinclusiveness relative to the 
exclusion concern. One of the more extreme consequences has been proposed 
legislation that would enshrine a zero-price rule as a substantive antitrust rule 
backed by private enforcement and treble damages.
72 Meanwhile, skeptics aim 
their critiques at anticompetitive exclusion, thereby giving the extraction 
arguments short shrift. 
II. Reconsidering  Exclusion 
This Part examines whether concerns about exclusion of content providers 
justify a zero-price rule. As a general matter, new regulation faces three 
formidable hurdles. First, there must be a plausible social harm to remedy. 
Second, existing law—here, antitrust law—must be an ineffective means of 
identifying and remedying the harm; otherwise, additional regulation is 
superfluous. Third, the regulation must effectively prevent the harmful conduct 
without also prohibiting too much harmless or desirable conduct, and without 
creating large new costs. 
69 See Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 7, at 50-51. 
70 Letter from Jeff Bezos, CEO, Amazon.com, et al. to Senators Ted Stevens & Daniel Inouye 
(Apr. 26, 2005), available at http://netcompetition.org/docs/pronetneut/leaders_042506.pdf. 
71 As Bonbright explained in 1961, “Readers of the treatises and the case law on public utility 
and railroad rates will often come across bald statements to the effect that . . . rate discrimination is 
unlawful.  .  .  . [S]uch statements are grossly inaccurate. What the law forbids is merely ‘undue’ or 
‘unjust’ discrimination.” BONBRIGHT, supra note 19, at 370. 
72 See H.R. 5417, 109th




Section II.A considers the most famous modern example of 
anticompetitive exclusion, the U.S. government’s antitrust case against 
Microsoft, as a source of analogies to the network neutrality context, in order to 
identify gaps in the existing prohibitions of antitrust that a zero-price rule might 
remedy. Sections II.B and II.C consider two possible gaps in antitrust 
coverage—call them the Vonage and Wikipedia gaps. The Vonage gap arises 
when an access provider, which already owns a legacy content business such as 
ordinary telephone service, excludes a competing content business. The 
Wikipedia gap arises when socially produced content competes with market 
production. Section II.B discusses why the Vonage gap does not justify zero-
price regulation. The Wikipedia gap presents a stronger argument for 
regulation, but, as explained in Section II.C, implementation of such regulation 
presents substantial practical difficulties. 
A.  Identifying Gaps in Antitrust Law 
United States v. Microsoft offers a useful template to frame the incentives 
of access providers and content providers.
73 In that case, the government 
alleged that Microsoft used its Windows operating system monopoly to impair 
the competitive prospects of Netscape’s browser, in order to prevent the 
emergence of Netscape as a competing software platform.
74 In order to exploit 
the analogy—which is inexact, to be sure
75—we must first ask, who is 
Microsoft here? Is it the access provider or the content provider? 
Consider, first, the access provider. An access provider could adopt a 
Microsoft strategy and preserve profits by forestalling competition in access 
provision. This scenario is a departure from the examples considered above. 
For example, AT&T could secure an agreement with YouTube, providing that 
AT&T customers receive exclusive access to YouTube content, thus shutting 
73 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam); cf. Lessig, I Blew It, supra note 64, at 
96 (assessing the “Microsoft-like network neutrality debate”). 
74 See 253 F.3d at 54-56 (discussing applications barrier to entry). For a technical account, see 
Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market 
Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND  J.  ECON. 194 (2002); for a nontechnical explanation, see 
Carlton, supra note 44. This theory of exclusion is distinct from the one discussed in Part I, in which the 
platform excludes in order to harvest incremental profits from noncaptive application customers. This 
discussion focuses upon the conduct examined in the D.C. Circuit’s landmark 2001 decision. It omits 
discussion of the earlier per-processor license case, enforcement of the earlier consent decree, and later 
allegations involving the Media Player, server software, and desktop search integration into Windows 
Vista. 
75 The particular mechanism considered in Microsoft, in which a complement today 
threatened to become a substitute in the future, is not directly applicable. But it may not be entirely 
irrelevant, if independent content providers threaten entry into the access provision business, as 
suggested by Google’s recent interest in municipal Wi-Fi and 700-megahertz spectrum auctions. See 
Elinor Mills, Google Versus the Telecoms, CNET  NEWS.COM, Nov. 30, 2007, 
http://www.news.com/Google-versus-the-telecoms/2100-1039_3-6220909.html (describing Google 
proposal, later abandoned, to offer municipal Wi-Fi in San Francisco, and plan to bid, ultimately 
unsuccessfully, in March 2008 FCC spectrum auction). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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out non-AT&T customers within AT&T’s territory. The point would be to slow 
the entry or induce the exit of competing access providers, by depriving them 
of content valued by broadband consumers.
76 Zero-price regulation—which 
aims to prevent differential treatment of content providers by an access 
provider, not differential treatment of access providers by a content provider—
does not address this problem at all. 
Network neutrality discussions are not concerned with the Microsoft-like 
incentives of access providers, but rather with the Microsoft-like incentives of 
content providers. The worry is that a content provider, linked by contract or 
common ownership to an access provider, will compensate the access provider 
in exchange for the latter’s exclusion of a competing content provider. 
Focusing upon content provider incentives may seem an unfamiliar way to 
think about the problem, given the demonization of access providers that 
sometimes accompanies policy analyses of broadband regulation. The slippage 
occurs because in the most familiar scenarios of concern, the content business 
that benefits from exclusion is owned in common with the access business that 
does the excluding. For example, Time Warner produces content, such as 
CNN.com, in addition to providing broadband access. AT&T, in addition to its 
Internet access business, provides ordinary telephone service—a content 
business, properly understood. The incentive of YouTube with respect to iFilm 
is analogous to CNN.com’s incentive with respect to other news providers. So 
is AT&T’s incentive to preserve its legacy business from encroachment by 
Vonage and other companies deploying voice-over-Internet protocol (VoIP), 
which enables users to hold voice conversations by transmitting the information 
as packets, without paying for ordinary telephone service. 
Despite the economic similarity, there is a crucial doctrinal difference 
between exclusion that occurs through contract, as in a hypothetical YouTube-
AT&T agreement to exclude iFilm, and exclusion accomplished through a 
refusal to deal—for example, a refusal by AT&T to permit Vonage to reach 
AT&T customers. Here we see a second use for the Microsoft analogy, besides 
the identification of troubling conduct, which is to identify the reach of existing 
antitrust prohibitions. Conduct that closely resembles the activity condemned in 
Microsoft is already subject to antitrust prohibition, and hence a poor candidate 
for new regulation. For exclusion accomplished by contract, such as the 
hypothetical YouTube-AT&T agreement to exclude iFilm, a zero-price rule is 
76 Put another way, a new entrant would be forced to secure an offering comparable to 
YouTube before entering and must now enter at both the platform and application layers. For a 
theoretical treatment of two-level entry, see Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos Stefanadis, Tying, Investment, 
and the Dynamic Leverage Theory, 32 RAND J. ECON. 52 (2001); see also Rubinfeld & Singer, Open 
Access, supra note 44, at 657-61, which found anticompetitive exclusion of rival access providers to be 
an unlikely effect of the Time Warner-AOL merger. Some access providers do pay for premium content 
such as ESPN360, a web-based streaming video service that is apparently not offered exclusively. See 
Adam Thompson, ESPN Calls a Do-Over on Its Online-Video Site, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2007, at B1 
(reporting that Verizon and AT&T have signed up for the service, while cable companies have 




unnecessary. As the Microsoft case demonstrates, the substantive reach of 
antitrust law already extends to contracts that choke off the distribution options 
of a rival.
77 
The Microsoft comparison has a third payoff, which is to raise questions 
about the effectiveness of after-the-fact antitrust suits as a deterrent and 
remedy. Antitrust cases can take years to resolve, and in the meantime, an 
incumbent’s control of the status quo can become entrenched. Microsoft is, 
perhaps, an apt example. Other cases, however, are less controversial 
demonstrations of the effectiveness of antitrust in coping with exclusion 
accomplished by contract.
78 
When an access provider acts in the interest of its content affiliate, as 
opposed to a contracting partner, the antitrust treatment is more complex. That 
circumstance is considered next. 
B.  The Vonage Gap: Refusing to Deal with a Legacy Business Competitor 
Exclusion accomplished through a refusal to deal raises distinct issues. 
Although functionally similar to exclusion achieved pursuant to a contract, its 
legal treatment is different. The exclusion by refusal to deal is not covered by 
section 1 of the Sherman Act, which requires an agreement.
79 That leaves 
section 2, which prohibits monopolization.
80 But refusals to deal often fall 
outside the scope of section 2, a lesson reinforced by a recent, controversial 
Supreme Court ruling.
81 
There is less to this apparent gap, however, than meets the eye. 
Fragmentation in the access provider market makes some refusals ineffective. 
77 Such cases can proceed under either section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., 
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-64 (condemning, as section 2 violation, contracts that prevented personal 
computer makers from distributing competing Netscape browser); United States v. Visa, 344 F.3d 229 
(2d Cir. 2003) (condemning, as section 1 violation, exclusionary agreement that prevented participating 
banks from issuing the credit cards of competing networks); see also United States v. Dentsply, 399 
F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2005) (condemning, as section 2 violation, a sales condition imposed by 
manufacturer that prevented buyers from purchasing products sold by competing manufacturers; 
condition was “as effective as those in written contracts”); cf. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 
U.S. 143 (1951) (imposing liability, under section 2 of the Sherman Act, for a refusal to sell advertising 
space except on the condition that the customer not buy from a rival). For academic analyses, see Hahn 
& Litan, supra note 30, at 10 (arguing that antitrust is sufficient to deal with “discriminat[ion] among 
unaffiliated content providers”); Robert W. Hahn & Scott Wallsten, The Economics of Net Neutrality, 
ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, June 2006, at 2, available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss6/art8 (similar). 
78  For example, the Visa and Dentsply cases discussed supra in note 77. Moreover, ex ante 
regulation is hardly quick and painless in practice. A regulatory proceeding can also take years to reach 
a conclusion, and can itself entrench a nonoptimal industry arrangement. A thorough review of the 
debate over ex post and ex ante modes of regulation is beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 7 
for an introduction to the relevant literature. 
79 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). In this respect, the Vonage example resembles Theatre 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954), in which each firm had an 
independent reason not to do business with the plaintiff, whatever choice its rivals made. 
80 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
81 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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Moreover, where refusals do pose an anticompetitive threat, existing antitrust 
law may address that conduct—and even if not, a broad zero-price rule is an 
inappropriate means to address the conduct. 
1.  Fragmentation of Access Provision 
Subsection II.B.1 introduced one theory of anticompetitive exclusion: that 
an access provider might monopolize a content market, in order to earn profit 
not only from its captive customers, but also noncaptive users of the content. A 
key condition for the success of that strategy is the access provider’s ability  
through exclusion to undermine the content provider’s achievement of effective 
scale—for example, by stealing so many customers that the application is 
unable to cover a large fixed cost or achieve sizable network effects among 
users. 
That ability depends upon the importance of the access provider’s captive 
customers to the success of the content provider. Even if a particular access 
provider has market power vis-à-vis its own consumers, it may be a quite 
unimportant source of customers for a content provider. The noncaptive 
customers—customers whose access is not controlled by the access provider—
protect the content provider against exclusion by preserving the content 
provider’s scale.
82 The presence of such customers—the very prize that 
motivates exclusion, from an access provider’s perspective—also makes 
exclusion more difficult to achieve. 
Most content markets have a large number of noncaptive customers. That 
is true, even if the market for content is limited to U.S. broadband customers, 
since the largest U.S. access provider controls no more than a quarter of that 
market.
83 For some content, dialup service is sufficient, providing a content 
provider with an additional source of noncaptive customers, and hence scale. 
And some content reaches a global audience, in which case the threat to scale 
recedes further. 
Some content providers enjoy a further advantage that reduces the 
exclusion threat. If the content is complementary to other content provided by 
the same firm—for example, Google’s integrated search, e-mail, and office 
productivity offerings—the content provider will be less vulnerable to attempts 
by an access provider to induce its exit. As a general matter, then, a content 
82 See Robert E. Litan & Hal J. Singer, Unintended Consequences of Net Neutrality 
Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533, 555-58 (2007) (making similar point). 
83 As of the end of 2007, cable had 33.5 million broadband subscribers, of which the main 
providers are Comcast (13.2 million), Time Warner (7.6), Cox (3.7), Charter (2.7), and Cablevision 
(2.3). DSL had 28.5 million subscribers, of which the main providers are AT&T (14.2 million), Verizon 
(8.2), Qwest (2.6), and Embarq (1.3). See Press Release, Leichtman Research Group, Over 8.5 Million 
Added Broadband from Top Cable and Telephone Companies in 2007 (Mar. 3, 2008), 
http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/030308release.html. On these figures, Comcast has a 21 




provider is not very vulnerable to exclusion by an access provider that controls 
only a small part of the content provider’s audience. That strategy can no more 
succeed than if a single computer manufacturer, such as Dell, had tried to shut 
down Netscape by refusing to carry the Netscape browser. 
There is a second mechanism of exclusion by refusal to deal, however, to 
which the fragmentation critique does not apply. To see why, let us return to 
the “AT&T versus Vonage” example. As already mentioned, AT&T offers both 
broadband access and ordinary telephone service, a legacy content business that 
competes with independent VoIP providers such as Vonage.
84 Allowing 
Vonage to reach AT&T customers erodes the profitability of the legacy 
business unless AT&T can implement an access charge that maintains existing 
profitability.
85 Otherwise, the access provider’s dominant strategy is exclusion. 
Moreover, each access provider with a legacy business has the same 
incentive. Even if one access provider is too small to have much effect on 
application scale, the access providers’ identical decisions, considered 
collectively, may have an exit-inducing effect. This is so, even if no access 
provider has any prospect of earning profits from noncaptive customers. The 
resulting exclusion—with accompanying static and dynamic harms—presents a 
significant problem for existing antitrust law, or else new regulation, to 
consider. 
2.  Existing Antitrust Prohibitions 
It is a difficult question whether an access provider’s refusal to deal with a 
VoIP provider triggers antitrust liability. Refusals to deal have long been 
controversial as a source of the anticompetitive action requirement of section 
2,
86 even beyond the skepticism with which the judiciary views exclusion 
claims generally.
87 The reluctance to impose liability has two bases. The first is 
that a refusal has welfare-increasing elements. For example, the prospect of 
profits from above-cost pricing is an inducement to innovative activity that 
84 Major providers of broadband access also have VoIP businesses. See, e.g., Press Release, 
Comcast Corp., Comcast Reports 2007 Results and Outlook for 2008, at 3 (Feb. 14, 2008), available at 
http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/080214/neth001.html (reporting 2.5 million “Comcast Digital Voice” 
subscribers, producing $1.8 billion in revenue, offset by declining revenues from circuit-switched 
telephony). 
85 In theory, AT&T could set an access fee equal to the profit lost from each customer that 
defects to Vonage, thereby causing Vonage to internalize the effect of its entry, and aligning the interests 
of the two firms. 
86 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. 
Hand, J.). One possible response is to attempt to impose liability only in a well-defined set of cases. For 
such a proposal, see Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing To Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177 
(2002). 
87 See, e.g., Schor v. Abbott Labs., 457 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 




88 Refusal also preserves vertical integration, which 
internalizes demand externalities across complementary markets, thereby 
avoiding the so-called “double marginalization” problem.
89 Refusal also avoids 
duplicative investments by content providers, a particularly relevant factor 
where the content provider offers a “me-too” product rather than an innovative 
improvement.
90 
The second basis is a set of prudential concerns about the ability of a court 
to identify and accomplish procompetitive interventions in the marketplace. For 
example, it is difficult for an outside observer to discern what is going on, 
compared to contracted-for exclusion, when the relevant basis for comparison, 
the bottleneck’s treatment of a corporate affiliate, is hidden from view within 
the firm. It is also difficult to identify natural limits upon the scope of liability, 
since almost any source of competitive advantage can be characterized as the 
bottleneck portion of an integrated firm and hence a candidate for court-
mandated access. And it is difficult to identify the “right” regulated price, a 
question outside the competence of a generalist court.
91 
Beyond these policy bases for denying liability, a recent Supreme Court 
case, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
92 
might seem to rule out liability entirely. There, plaintiff alleged that an 
incumbent local exchange carrier had refused to deal with a rival carrier, in 
violation of the carrier’s interconnection obligation under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. One reading of that case, by no means the 
narrowest, is that refusals to deal by telecommunications providers are now 
beyond antitrust scrutiny.
93 
Despite these difficulties, a solid argument can be made that an access 
provider’s refusal to deal with a VoIP provider does trigger antitrust liability by 
emphasizing the refusal’s negative effect on competition (and, less 
convincingly, innovation
94). Suppose, in what follows, that the welfare loss 
88 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004). This is the mainstream view. See, e.g., FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 120 (quoting Trinko 
on this point with approval). 
89 When multiple firms in complementary markets exercise market power independently, the 
aggregate distortion increases. For an early discussion of the point, see AUGUSTIN  A.  COURNOT, 
RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 103 (Nathaniel T. 
Bacon trans., MacMillan 1927) (1838). 
90  See N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 
RAND J. ECON. 48 (1986) (demonstrating that free entry can be inefficient if entrants merely steal 
business from rivals); Patrick DeGraba, Why Lever into a Zero-Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and 
Exclusion, 5 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 433 (1996) (specifying conditions under which exclusion 
increases welfare by reducing wasteful duplication of fixed costs by independent producers). 
91 See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841 (1990). 
92 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
93 A narrower reading, considered infra, limits the holding to situations where any 
competitive harm is already identified and remedied by the sector-specific regulatory regime. 
94 The incumbents’ own use of VoIP suggests that VoIP innovation might not depend upon 




from reduced competition is larger than the welfare-increasing aspects of 
refusal—for if not, the basic premise for government intervention (whether by 
antitrust or new regulation) is lacking. In any event, the argument that a refusal 
has a welfare-increasing effect does not distinguish this conduct from an 
exclusionary contract, which (if permitted) also increases ex ante incentives,
95 
though the similar economic effects of exclusionary refusals and exclusionary 
contracts has been underappreciated by courts. 
The remaining objections to antitrust liability can be overcome. Trinko 
does not stand in the way. Trinko and other cases have denied liability when the 
resource withheld by an incumbent is not generally available for sale: new 
product plans, as in Berkey Photo,
96 or “unbundled network elements” not 
generally sold to consumers, as in Trinko. A VoIP provider such as Vonage, by 
contrast, seeks to take advantage of a facility that is made broadly available by 
the access provider.
97 This distinction places a manageable limit on the scope 
of liability. Moreover, Trinko emphasized that effective sectoral regulation that 
addresses the conduct reduces the incremental value of antitrust intervention.
98 
Similarly effective regulation addressed to the conduct is absent here. In sum, 
Trinko does not bar antitrust liability for an access provider’s refusal to deal 
with Vonage.
99 
If these arguments convince a court, then there is no role here for 
additional regulation. If not, and if (under our assumptions) there is a Vonage 
gap to fill, a zero-price rule is the wrong way to fill it. A zero-price rule is 
radically overinclusive relative to the Vonage gap. It prohibits not only parallel 
refusals to deal that are (possibly) outside the scope of antitrust, but also 
refusals that are unlikely to raise any competitive concern, exclusive contracts 
already prohibited by antitrust law, and extraction strategies that have nothing 
to do with competition. 
Such overinclusion might conceivably be tolerated if no narrower rule 
were feasible. But in fact, a narrower rule is readily available. Restricting the 
rule’s application to cases when the content provider seeks access from an 
access provider that owns a competing legacy business would focus the rule’s 
scope. Prohibiting only discriminatory treatment for independent content, 
relative to affiliates, would likewise narrow the rule as to substance.  To be 
sure, the narrower rule entails administrative complexity, in determining 
whether discriminatory treatment has occurred. But in this respect the seeming 
95 Cf. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 301-
05 (2003) (noting pervasiveness of tradeoff between innovation and competition). 
96 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274, 276, 287 (2d Cir. 1979). 
97 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (imposing 
liability where defendant denied access to product generally available for sale). 
98 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411-15 
(2004). 
99 An alternative strategy is to characterize the conduct as tying or predation. See Robinson, 
supra note 86, at 1178 (arguing that opportunities to recharacterize are pervasive). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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comparative simplicity of the zero-price rule—that it does not require detailed 
price regulation
100—is misleading. If an access provider with a content affiliate 
reduces quality but without raising price, that form of discrimination will be 
difficult to observe, much less establish in a judicial or administrative 
proceeding. A zero-price rule necessitates an administratively difficult inquiry 
into the quality of access granted.
101 
In short, even if (as we have assumed) a parallel refusal to deal creates a 
net social harm, and even if antitrust liability does not extend to that case, a 
zero-price rule is difficult to understand as a response to the resulting Vonage 
gap. 
C.  The Wikipedia Gap: Exclusion of Social Production 
The Vonage example raises a general issue. Where an access provider is 
able to collect profits from one content provider but not its rival,
102 the access 
provider has an incentive to exclude the latter content provider. Social 
production presents a second situation where an inability to extract creates an 
incentive to exclude, and in which parallel action by access providers can have 
a large aggregate effect. As explained in this section, social production has 
distinctive features that make it unusually valuable, but also unusually 
vulnerable to a particular form of exclusion. That mechanism of exclusion is 
not subject to the prohibitions of antitrust law, moreover, presenting a relatively 
stronger argument for regulation. 
1.  Distinctive Features of Social Production 
Up to now, we have assumed that content is provided by an ordinary 
market actor, such as YouTube, Vonage, or the New York Times. But socially 
produced content is a distinctive source of Internet content. Social production, 
as I use the term, entails collaboration by a large number of decentralized, 
unpaid individuals, who derive utility from producing despite—or because of—
the lack of direct financial incentive. The major conditions for success are that 
100 A zero-price rule sidesteps the concern raised by Owen, supra note 18, at 2, that “[n]et 
neutrality policies could only be implemented through detailed price regulation.” 
101 A more aggressive solution to the incentive to favor affiliated producers is line of business 
restrictions. The most famous example is the AT&T government consent decree. United States v. 
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 224 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 
(1983). This solution has drawbacks of its own, including the limits it imposes upon efficient vertical 
integration. For a summary of this debate, compare Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of 
End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 
940-46 (2001) (advocating separation in the context of broadband carriers and Internet service 
providers), with Farrell & Weiser, supra note 43, at 100-05 (noting efficiency of vertical integration and 
incentives to maximize overall value), and James B. Speta, A Vision of Internet Openness by 
Government Fiat, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1553, 1565-66 (2002) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE 
OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001)) (similar). 




the inputs to production are decentralized (or else public goods) and that the 
overall project can be subdivided effectively.
103 Examples include the 
collaborative encyclopedia Wikipedia and distributed computing projects such 
as Folding@home.
104 
Social production has a distinctive virtue and, in some circumstances, a 
distinctive vulnerability. The virtue is that social production can be more 
efficient than market production, in part because it avoids transaction costs in 
the sharing of excess capacity (computer processing cycles, leisure hours).
105 
The vulnerability arises when social production competes with market-
produced Internet content, and exclusion by a broadband access provider is 
feasible. Wikipedia, for example, competes with Encyclopedia Britannica and 
other for-profit encyclopedias. (The present analysis thus excludes many other 
forms of “social” collaboration, such as a book club or a family, that do not 
face that exclusion threat.) 
The distinctive vulnerability is that a social producer is less able to pay an 
access fee. The degree of disability varies. Some may be able to raise funds, by 
charging consumers or accepting advertising. (These and other sources of 
protection are considered below in Subsection II.C.3.) But fundraising may be 
impractical due to the transaction costs of raising small amounts of money from 
each of many users, and the risk that collecting money or permitting advertising 
will disrupt the nonfinancial esprit de corps on which the success of social 
production, in some cases, may rest.
106 If so, the social producer may be 
vulnerable to the mechanism of exclusion considered next. 
2.  Mechanism of Exclusion 
Social production alters the competitive dynamic between content 
providers and access providers. An access provider has an incentive to earn 
profits from a content provider by offering premium access in exchange for a 
fee. To fix ideas, suppose Wikipedia and Encyclopedia Britannica offer 
competing encyclopedias to consumers. An access provider offers faster access 
at a premium price, and makes this offer available to all interested content 
providers. Customers prefer faster access, so Encyclopedia Britannica pays the 
fee. Wikipedia, though offered the same terms, is unable to pay, and loses some 
customers as a result. Each access provider has the same incentive; for each, it 
103 For a fuller account, see BENKLER, supra note 6, at 99-106. 
104 See  http://folding.stanford.edu (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). The project uses the spare 
computing power of distributed users to solve computation-intensive problems related to protein folding, 
a key step in understanding how misfolded proteins cause disease. 
105 BENKLER, supra note 6, at 106-16; see also Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple 
Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197, 212-20 (2002) (discussing career concerns and ego 
gratification as incentives for social production). 
106  Cf. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) 
(describing how introduction of financial penalties can alter altruistic behavior). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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is a dominant strategy to offer the premium service and for Encyclopedia 
Britannica to accept. 
The aggregate effect of the premium service contracts is to deprive 
Wikipedia of scale. If fewer consumers look to Wikipedia for answers, then 
likely fewer will contribute, reducing its quality. More generally, social 
production will suffer where the content’s value enjoys increasing returns to 
scale. If the provider has significant fixed costs, otherwise covered by charging 
consumers or accepting advertising—for those social producers that can raise 
limited funds—reduced access to consumers may undermine its ability to cover 
those costs. 
The exclusionary effect of the premium access contracts can reduce 
welfare. If social production is excluded or suppressed, society loses the 
productive advantages that can accompany social production. Nevertheless, 
antitrust law does not prohibit this welfare-reducing transaction. Each access 
provider here has an incentive to exclude without agreement among the 
providers. The incentive does not necessarily depend upon a strategic 
motivation to impede the socially produced content provider or deprive it of 
scale. Here, an antitrust enforcer would focus upon the increased consumer 
satisfaction from faster speeds, and the fact that Encyclopedia Britannica and 
the access provider would make this agreement, whatever the effect upon 
Wikipedia. The rationality of this conduct, even without considering the 
negative effect on Wikipedia, differentiates this situation from a payment by 
Encyclopedia Britannica made only to cause the access provider to block 
access to Wikipedia, a payment which would violate antitrust law.
107 
3.  Limited Feasibility of Regulation 
The welfare-reducing nature of the transaction just described, combined 
with an absence of antitrust enforcement, implies a gap in existing law, and 
hence a potential role for a narrowly focused zero-price rule. Unlike the 
Vonage gap, moreover, the Wikipedia gap cannot be filled with a weaker rule 
that merely requires an access provider to make any offer generally available to 
rivals. It is useless to insist that an access provider make Wikipedia an offer it 
107 The vulnerability of social production in its competition with market production is a 
significant challenge to its viability as a mode of production. For an introduction, see Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz,  Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE  L.J. 1472, 1493-1504 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI 
BENKLER, THE  WEALTH OF NETWORKS:  HOW  SOCIAL  PRODUCTION  TRANSFORMS  MARKETS AND 
FREEDOM (2006)); cf. BENKLER, supra note 6, at 383-459 (describing wide variety of policy challenges 
to social production). Strahilevitz considers several ways in which Encyclopedia Britannica might pose a 
challenge to Wikipedia, including the insertion of deliberate errors, Strahilevitz, supra, at 1497, and 
(more generally) the purchase of excess capacity on which social production relies, id. at 1499. By 
contrast, the distinct mechanism considered here need not rely upon a deliberate strategy of exclusion by 




can’t accept. A rule that merely policed the offers made would fail to prevent 
the social harm.
108 
A zero-price rule, implemented where social production competes with 
market production, amounts to a tailored subsidy for social production. The 
“subsidy” label is not itself troubling; many protective regulations, including 
antitrust law, provide effective subsidies to their beneficiaries. Nor is a narrow 
zero-price rule merely a subsidy to support amateurs, vulnerable to Coase’s 
acid quip that “an amateur is someone who does not pay for the things he 
uses.”
109 The underlying premise is that social production brings distinctive 
economic benefits, described above, that merit protection if regulation can be 
accomplished at acceptable cost. 
Moreover, much social production has no plausible claim to protection. 
First, new regulation has no place where the social producer can collect 
substantial fees from users. In some circumstances, fee collection will be 
feasible; social producers can and do pay some bills.
110 Second, new regulation 
has no place where the access provider is able to collect fees from users, for if 
so, exclusion is no longer a more profitable strategy for the access provider.
111 
Third, new regulation has no place where the social producer has powerful 
market complementors. Where a market producer benefits from the success of 
social production, it has an interest in preserving the success of the social 
producer. It will assist in the implementation of counterstrategies that 
undermine exclusion.
112 For example, IBM has an incentive to protect Linux as 
a complement to certain IBM businesses. Similarly, open-source programmers 
who write code to make the online community Second Life more accessible to 
disabled people are in little danger, given the interest of Linden Lab, Second 
Life’s owner, in preserving their success.
113 
108 Nor would the line-of-business restriction considered in Section II.B help. A still narrower 
rule, however, is possible: to prohibit charges only as to the socially produced content, while permitting 
access charges to the rival market-produced content. That narrower rule would increase the effective 
subsidy to socially produced content at the expense of market-produced content. 
109 See R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1, 37 (1959). 
The subject was a then-novel proposal to create property rights in electromagnetic spectrum, and Dallas 
Smythe, a former chief economist of the FCC, had presented a series of objections, such as the 
displacement of current users, including radio amateurs, “which by definition could hardly be expected 
to pay for frequency use.” Dallas W. Smythe, Facing Facts About the Broadcast Business, 20 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 96, 99 (1952). Coase’s quip was part of a critique of Smythe’s views. 
110 See, e.g., What We Need the Money For, http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/ 
What_we_need_the_money_for (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (describing uses of donations to Wikipedia); 
Wikimedia Fundraising, http://fundraising.wikimedia.org/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (listing 
donations). 
111 User fees, whether levied by the social producer or the access provider, are more feasible 
where the value to each user is relatively large and either does not vary too much across consumers or 
price discrimination is sufficiently effective to capture the variation. 
112 Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 
263, 284-88 (1981) (describing a variety of strategic responses to an incumbent’s predation). 
113 See Linden Lab, Open Source, http://secondlifegrid.net/programs/open_source (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2008) (noting availability of source code for Second Life Viewer). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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These three conditions, taken together, cabin the scope of protection to a 
substantial degree. In those remaining instances where social production faces a 
market rival, an access provider could be forbidden to charge for premium 
service where such charge would create a significant risk of exclusion due to 
the social producer’s inability to pay. It is worth asking, of course, whether new 
regulation, thus limited, is worth having. An affirmative answer requires 
confidence in several propositions: that social production offers unique value, 
that exclusion will cause that value to dissipate rather than shift to similarly 
valuable but less vulnerable social production projects, that worthy and 
unworthy claimants to the subsidy can be distinguished,
114 and that a subsidy 
borne in the first instance by access providers is more efficient than one drawn 
from general taxation. And there remain the usual difficult questions of 
implementing a zero-price rule identified in other critiques of network 
neutrality regulation, including the risk of entrenching the technological status 
quo, the vulnerability of new regulation to capture, and the loss of transparency 
that accompanies use of a disguised subsidy through regulation rather than a 
direct payment. These difficulties are general to all applications of zero-price 
rules, and do not alter the result that social production provides a relatively 
promising focus for proponents of zero-price rules, compared to market-
produced content. 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that Commissioner Adelstein and 
Google are wrong to look to a zero-price rule as a necessary means to protect 
content providers generally from exclusion. Regulatory proponents have two 
options, which are not mutually exclusive. They can narrow their advocacy to 
protection of socially produced content—an underexplored option—or rely 
upon a second economic argument for zero-price regulation, that such rules are 
needed as a response to extraction, to which we now turn. 
III. Reconsidering  Extraction 
Extraction concerns are at the heart of modern advocacy of zero-price 
regulation.
115 As explained in Part I, the central extraction concern is that when 
an access provider charges a content provider for access, content provider 
profits fall. The reduction in prospective profits reduces a content provider’s 
incentive to innovate and hence the amount of innovation. 
Compared to exclusion, extraction is a more promising ground for 
regulation, for two reasons. First, antitrust law does not already prohibit 
extraction. Regulating extraction is the realm of industrial policy, not 
114 As a theoretical matter, if protection of social production were sufficiently important, 
overinclusion might be tolerated as a second-best measure. 
115 See, e.g., Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 63, at 414 n.119 (“Proposals for 
network neutrality are driven by concerns about a reduction in application-level innovation.”); id. at 416 




competition policy. Second, a zero-price rule is better tailored to extraction 
concerns than it is to exclusion concerns. The source of the posited problem is 
the transfer of profits from a content provider to an access provider; the 
proposed solution is to prohibit transfer. A weaker rule that permits extraction, 
provided only that the extraction is conducted in an evenhanded manner, does 
not solve that problem. 
As noted in Part I, the extraction argument attracts an immediate response: 
that not only content innovation but also infrastructure innovation must be 
taken into account, and that subsidizing content development necessarily comes 
at the expense of network development. Optimal compensation to the access 
provider and the content provider is a joint innovation problem. In general, the 
benefit from an application used in conjunction with a platform—whether a 
new video game compatible with a console or a new search engine used by 
broadband consumers—is made possible by two distinct investments. One is 
the investment made to design and develop the application. The platform owner 
makes an investment, too, in the infrastructure necessary to deliver or enable 
the complementary application. These two actions jointly produce incremental 
value, a point not lost on industry insiders in the network neutrality context.
116 
With a single innovator, there is a benchmark “internalization” solution, in 
which an inventor is paid an amount equal to the social value she creates.
117 An 
amount less than full internalization will also induce the invention, provided 
that it covers the inventor’s costs, including her opportunity cost in developing 
the invention.
118 The internalization solution fails under joint innovation. When 
two inventors are each but-for causes of an increase in value, paying each of 
them an amount equal to the increase is problematic for two reasons. First, if 
payments from users privately fund the innovation, there is not enough 
compensation to go around. Second, that solution, even if feasible, would 
inefficiently induce innovation even where it is not cost justified.
119 Joint 
innovation is a classic, notoriously difficult problem in the regulation of 
innovation. How best to provide incentives to multiple innovators has been a 
116 Verizon CEO Ivan Seidenberg articulated a similar sentiment: “Those guys [Google and 
Microsoft] gotta use a network. But it’s also incredible when you see the innovation that a Google, a 
Microsoft or an AOL can create. In the long run, Google won’t work without us, and we won’t work 
without them.” Paul Kapustka, Verizon Says Google, Microsoft Should Pay for Internet Apps, 
INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 5, 2006, http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml? 
articleID=175801854. 
117 Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q. J. 
ECON. 1137 (1998); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property 
Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001). 
118 For an argument emphasizing this point, see Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, 
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 276-79 (2007). 
119 Suppose that two jointly necessary innovations, which cost a and b to develop, produce 
social value v. Inducing the innovation is efficient provided a + b < v. But the compensation structure 
discussed in the text induces innovation whenever a < v and b < v, even if a + b > v. ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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particular preoccupation of patent scholarship. No consensus answer has 
emerged.
120 
Four problems, each underappreciated in the existing literature, undercut 
the extraction-based argument for a zero-price rule. First, zero-price rules 
prohibit direct extraction but permit more costly indirect extraction, causing 
implementation of the rule to unravel in practice. Second, nonfinancial 
motivations to create Internet content reduce the negative effect of extraction 
on content development. Third, extraction may be a principal component of a 
plan to increase consumer “spillovers” by subsidizing consumer broadband 
adoption. Fourth, it has not been established empirically that independent 
content will be starved for investment without a shift in the regulatory 
entitlement. 
A.  The Indirect Extraction Problem 
A zero-price rule is asymmetric. It prohibits an access provider from 
charging a content provider to send information to consumers, but permits 
charging the consumer to receive that information. The AT&T merger 
condition, for example, prohibits discrimination among content providers, but 
permits it for consumers desiring different quality of service for a particular 
kind of data.
121 Network neutrality proponents frequently approve 
discrimination among consumers.
122 
The appeal of asymmetric regulation is easy to see. Proponents of 
regulation fear that an access provider will misbehave toward content 
providers. Regulating the interaction between the two is the most direct 
response. Moreover, as regulation proponents concede, price discrimination is a 
useful tool for fixed cost recovery.
123 If the access provider is to take advantage 
of this tool, yet not discriminate among content providers, it must be able to 
price discriminate among consumers. 
The problem with this view is that asymmetric regulation can unravel. As 
a general matter, a platform is not limited to access fees as a means to extract 
profits from an application. It can instead raise its price to consumers to a level 
120 Compare S UZANNE  SCOTCHMER,  INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 135-42 (2004) 
(describing circumstances under which upstream inventor is most important to protect), with John H. 
Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 
ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 453-55 (1997) (arguing that downstream inventor is proper focus of protection). 
121 The terms of AT&T’s commitment apply to discriminatory provision or sales to a content 
provider, but not to a consumer. 
122 See Lessig Testimony, supra note 63, at 2 (endorsing consumer tiering as means to fund 
infrastructure development); Lessig AEI Presentation, supra note 15, at 24:05 (same); see also Yoo, 
Antitrust, supra note 33, at 517 (concluding that network neutrality proponents have “conceded the 
validity of consumer-side tiering”); Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 7, at 50 (concluding that “all parties 
in this debate agree [that] broadband operators should be able to charge consumers for different levels of 
broadband service”). But see Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 118, at 297-98 (suggesting that 
consumer price discrimination is impermissible). 




that captures consumers’ incremental gains from use of the application. The 
more the platform charges, the less surplus is left over for the application to 
capture as profit.
124 In the most extreme version, the platform captures all of the 
surplus created by the application, forcing the application to sell at cost.
125 
A platform’s choice of strategy depends upon the web of ongoing 
financial relationships among the platform, application, and consumer. For 
example, where the platform lacks an ongoing financial relationship with the 
consumer, an access charge levied upon the application provider is easier to 
implement—a game console maker can more readily charge game makers a 
royalty on each game sold, rather than charge consumers for each game 
purchased. Setting a high consumer access price is an attractive alternative 
where the platform has an ongoing financial relationship with the consumer,
126 
and the consumer has a relationship with the application.
127 
A zero-price rule that bans direct extraction through an access charge 
leaves open indirect extraction through a higher consumer access price, and a 
rational access provider will take advantage of this loophole. An access 
provider might offer customers, for a fee, higher-quality access to a particular 
type of content, such as video streaming or search results, in the expectation 
that content providers will compensate the consumer for the higher price. To 
continue the taxation analogy, it’s as though policymakers had implemented a 
value-added tax, and decided to shift collection of the tax from sellers to 
buyers. That shift does not change the incidence of the tax. 
Compensation can take several forms. Content providers already 
compensate consumers directly to use their services. Some firms have paid 
customers for the privilege of connecting them to advertisers.
128 Microsoft has 
announced a plan to pay companies to use its search product.
129 Some 
124 Rey & Tirole, supra note 41, at 2186; J.A. Ordover et al., Nonprice Anticompetitive 
Behavior by Dominant Firms Toward the Producers of Complementary Products, in ANTITRUST AND 
REGULATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF JOHN J. MCGOWAN 115, 116-17 (Franklin M. Fisher ed., 1985). 
125 Rey & Tirole, supra note 41, at 2186 (considering model in which platform owner sets 
price first, capturing surplus and forcing application to sell at cost); Farrell & Katz, supra note 54, at 414 
& n.4 (similar). 
126 In practice, the console maker may enjoy a continuing relationship with the consumer 
through the sale of warranties, downloadable legacy games, and access to online gaming networks. 
127 In effect, a “two-sided” market becomes “one-sided.” For a technical exposition, see 
Rochet & Tirole, supra note 5, at 648 (onesidedness exists where the volume of transactions depends 
only upon the price level, not the price structure). See infra Section III.C for further discussion of two-
sided markets. 
128 See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha & Leslie Walker, A Pyramid Marketing Ploy Clicks, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1999, at A1 (“AllAdvantage and dozens of other companies are rushing to build 
big audiences by handing out cash to people willing to let advertisers track their Web surfing and send 
them ads tailored to their habits.”). This strategy, however, has not proved particularly successful. See 
Duncan Riley, Agloco Doesn’t Pay to Surf, Joins Deadpool, TECHCRUNCH, Dec. 10, 2007, 
http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/12/10/agloco-doesnt-pay-to-surf-joins-deadpool/ (describing demise 
of a successor to AllAdvantage). 
129 See Thomas Claburn, Microsoft Pays Enterprise Customers to Adopt Windows Live 
Search, INFORMATIONWEEK, Mar. 16, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/news/ ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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compensation is less explicit, as with advertising exposure that is traded for 
free content.
130 Compensation could also take the form of a decrease in the 
amount consumers would otherwise pay the content provider for a particular 
service. 
The strategy applies not only to content providers that earn profits by 
charging consumers, but also to content providers that profit by charging third 
parties such as advertisers or by reducing costs through online rather than face-
to-face transactions. The access provider can capture these gains, too, through 
careful consumer pricing.
131 For example, suppose that a consumer receives a 
benefit of 40 from using a particular type of content, plus an additional benefit 
of 60 from access to all other types of content. Each provider of the particular 
type of content receives no revenue directly from consumers but earns 50 from 
advertising. A zero-price rule prevents the access provider from charging the 
content provider directly for access. 
If the access provider sets a price to consumers of 100, it captures the 
consumer’s gain but not the content provider’s profits. But the access provider 
can do better, by charging a price of 150. This is more than the consumer’s 
benefit of 100, and so the consumer will not purchase access (and thereby 
access the content) unless compensated 50 to do so. But the content provider 
will have the necessary incentive to pay the consumer 50—for without the 
consumer, it cannot reap the benefit of advertisement—in order to make the 
overall transaction worthwhile. This is an extreme example, in which the entire 
benefit is handed to the access provider, but the point is general. In this way, 
indirect extraction induces the content provider to offer consumers a negative 
price, as in the Microsoft example. 
Nor does this technique exhaust the instruments of indirect extraction. An 
access provider, prohibited from charging an access fee, could invest in the 
development of a competing application. The goal is not to reduce independent 
content development—though this may be a byproduct—but rather to put 
downward pressure on the price charged, thereby increasing the consumer 
surplus that the access provider can capture.
132 
Indirect extraction undermines the effectiveness of a zero-price rule as an 
instrument for preventing direct extraction. If an access provider captures 
profits by charging consumers based upon the content used (in anticipation of 
content provider reimbursement of the consumer), rather than charging the 
content provider directly, there will be a reduction in content provider profits, 
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=198001615 (describing plan to pay businesses on a per-PC basis for use of 
Microsoft’s Live Search product). 
130 The compensation is particularly clear when the exchange is sequential rather than 
simultaneous, as with Salon’s Ultramercials. Stefanie Olsen, Salon: Watch Ad, Read Articles For Free, 
CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 20, 2002, available at http://www.news.com/2100-1023-966664.html. 
131 Cf. van Schewick, supra note 46, at 342-45 (concluding that content provider profits 
earned from advertising can be extracted by an access provider only through vertical integration). 




the very effect that a zero-price rule aims to prevent. Moreover, because 
indirect extraction has a tendency to restore the status quo, critics of zero-price 
rules may not see their fears materialize.
133 
At the same time, the access provider’s resort to indirect extraction creates 
several new sources of social cost. Those costs include the implementation of 
the indirect extraction scheme and countermeasures by consumers and content 
providers to insulate themselves from indirect extraction. In tax terms, shifting 
the collection from sellers to buyers can alter the cost of collection, 
independent of the tax’s incidence. As a matter of theory, it is uncertain 
whether these costs are greater than the costs of implementing a direct 
extraction scheme and of countermeasures employed by content providers to 
insulate themselves from direct extraction. 
Indirection does not undermine zero-price regulation aimed at exclusion, 
or at least not to the same extent. Indirect exclusion, to be effective, requires a 
narrowly focused deal between an access provider and a consumer that favors 
one content provider over its rival. But that level of specificity will be difficult 
to implement. For one thing, an explicit contract implementing that 
discriminatory deal would raise antitrust concerns, for the reasons discussed in 
Part II. Moreover, if an access provider is limited, as a legal or practical matter, 
to consumer pricing that varies with the type of content and intensity of use, but 
not the particular content provider, then indirect exclusion will be difficult to 
implement. 
B.  Nonfinancial Incentives to Develop Content 
A tax on innovative content burdens both startups and established firms. 
Some advocates worry that this burden will disproportionately fall upon 
startups.
134 But this is not a necessary outcome. First, it is not clear what 
constitutes a disproportionate burden. Extraction, from the content provider’s 
perspective, resembles an electrical bill or building rent, and we would not 
normally think of these latter categories as posing an unusual, disproportionate 
burden upon a startup content provider that ought to be remedied by requiring 
the service provider to provide a discount or rent abatement. 
Moreover, the relative burden depends upon the fine detail of the access 
charge—a lump sum versus a percentage of profits, or a graduated scale 
indexed to use of the network. An access provider has a strong incentive to 
133 For a representative example of such fears, see Sidak, supra note 50, at 351-52 (arguing 
that network neutrality regulation will deny access to consumers with low willingness to pay). 
134 For example, Lessig writes: “[I]t will be the new innovators who bear the burden of these 
taxes most heavily. The point is obvious when you think about the history of YouTube. Had network 
owners been charging an access premium, investors in an upstart like YouTube would have had good 
reason to think twice. All taxes are a barrier, but this tax would be a particularly high barrier to 
innovation. It would hinder newcomers such as YouTube by favouring established companies such as 
Google and Yahoo.” Lessig, Congress, supra note 64. ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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maximize the value of complementary applications.
135 An access provider has 
an incentive to “soak the rich,” whose investments are already sunk, rather than 
fledgling firms that are a source of future profits—or a source of competition to 
other content providers, ultimately making more surplus available for capture 
by the access provider. 
That prospect might nevertheless have some chilling effect on a fledgling 
content provider that makes decisions based upon the probability of future great 
wealth. This concern, however, is undermined by a particular feature of content 
development: nonfinancial incentives to create content. Much of the celebrated 
explosion of new tools and services on the Internet has required no financial 
motivation. Wikipedia’s contributors have built a powerful encyclopedia 
without compensation.
136 Blogs have emerged on every possible subject, often 
(though not always) without a direct financial motive. The millions of users 
whose contributed content populates YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook are 
not compensated. 
Moreover, leading Internet businesses that have profit-making at their 
core today had non-financial origins. Pierre Omidyar started eBay and Jerry 
Yang organized the link list that became Yahoo as hobbies.
137 Sergey Brin and 
Larry Page developed Google’s original search algorithm as a research project, 
in part to solve an academic puzzle not itself about search.
138 
Thus, some content innovation is relatively insensitive to the charging of a 
toll. For some content, permission to extract makes no difference because 
there’s nothing to extract or the amounts are too small to feasibly collect. For 
others, charging a toll will have only a limited effect. For MySpace and 
Facebook, payment of some profits to a network provider would reduce the 
firm’s profits, but not necessarily alter the incentives of individual users. eBay, 
Google, and Yahoo likely would have flourished even if their founders had 
anticipated a “network tax” if they achieved extreme financial success. 
This point has an analogue in discussions of optimal patent policy. Some 
innovation can be elicited without expectation of financial compensation. Some 
low-effort ideas will be supplied by inventors even without payment. Non-
market financial incentives, such as government and university research grants, 
compensate other inventors. Moreover, innovation is often induced by 
nonfinancial rewards, including the thrill of discovery, satisfaction from 
winning a competition, and the esteem of peers. Where an invention would 
135 See infra Section III.D for further discussion. 
136 Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head, 438 NATURE 900 (2005). 
137 See Saul Hansell, Creator of the On-Line Swap Meet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at BU2 
(describing how Omidyar began eBay “on a lark”); Verne Kopytoff, It Started as 2 Guys in a Trailer; 
Yahoo Stands as One of Internet’s Biggest Success Stories, S.F.  CHRON., Feb. 28, 2005, at E1 
(describing Yahoo’s “hobby” origins). 
138 See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES 
OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 65-93 (2005) (describing Stanford research project 




have been made nearly as quickly without patent protection, the need for 
protection diminishes.
139 
The concern about incentives is particularly muted where the startup costs 
are low.
140 To be sure, even such a firm may eventually require a massive 
infrastructure in order to achieve success. Amazon, eBay, Google, and Yahoo, 
like YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook, require large investments to set up the 
servers, connectivity, and support necessary for scale. Without a prospect of 
profit, investors would not make this capital available. But in this respect, 
content provision lacks a distinctive claim to a subsidy. Its investors are 
identical to those making infrastructure investments on the network side. 
Investments in content provider infrastructure may be dulled by the payment of 
a toll, and the tradeoff to be made is between content provider infrastructure 
and access provider infrastructure. 
C.  Extraction as a Means to Increase Consumer Spillovers 
Extraction, aside from having a relatively small negative effect upon the 
development of some content, may be a key component of a strategy to 
increase consumer broadband adoption. Scholars have described broadband 
access as a source of positive consumer spillovers.
141 Connectivity permits 
individuals to consume and produce creative content and fosters the 
development of social capital. The value may not be capturable by an access 
provider or content provider because it is unobservable, is beyond the grasp of 
feasible price discrimination, accrues partly to other users rather than the 
immediate consumer, or escapes the notice of the consumer and hence is not 
included in her willingness to pay.
142 Although this economic dark matter is 
difficult to quantify, careful students of the phenomena have reckoned the 
benefits to be large.
143 
139 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (understanding patentability 
standard as a way to “wee[d] out”—that is, restrict patentability to—”those inventions which would not 
be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent”); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 
1324, 1346 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“[I]f a court thinks an invention for which a patent is 
being sought would have been made as soon or almost as soon as it was made even if there were no 
patent laws, then it must pronounce . . . the patent invalid.”). 
140 Randall Stross, The Human Touch That May Loosen Google’s Grip, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 
2007, at BU3 (“The combination of low start-up costs and potentially huge profit makes [search 
startups] seem a reasonable bet.”); see also Wu Testimony, supra note 64, at 56 (noting that for many 
Internet businesses, “startup costs are minimal: many successful business[es] began with just an idea and 
a good web site”). 
141 See, e.g., Frischmann & Lemley, supra  note 118, at 279 (“[T]he demand-signaling 
function . . . does not necessarily work well when purchasers use a resource as an input . . . .”); id. at 
293-98 (applying this argument to network neutrality). 
142 Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 1017-20 (2005). 
143 See Frischmann, supra note 142, at 1017-19; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 118, at 
296-98;  see also R .  P o l k  W a g n e r ,  Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the 
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
Yale Journal on Regulation   
138 
 
There are two ways to increase the consumer benefits of broadband usage. 
One is the intensive margin: increasing the welfare of an existing broadband 
user. The other is the extensive margin: turning a nonuser into a user. The latter 
strategy seems promising, in part because consumer adoption of broadband in 
the United States has significantly lagged behind that of other countries. As of 
the end of 2006, U.S. adoption reached 20 connections per 100 people, fifteenth 
among surveyed countries and less than two-thirds the penetration of Denmark, 
the world leader.
144 
In particular, access providers could subsidize consumer adoption by 
charging content providers for access.
145 AT&T’s pitch might be: “We’re 
committed to pervasive broadband service, and to making access available to 
the millions who lack such service, by asking successful content providers to 
tithe a fraction of their profits, to be applied toward the provision of new 
consumer access.” This strategy would increase consumer-side spillovers but 
violate a zero-price rule. The attractiveness of this proposition runs counter to 
the assertion, sometimes made, that a zero-price rule is necessary to preserve 
consumer spillovers.
146 
The access provider is particularly well positioned to coordinate a strategy 
that promotes broadband adoption. To be sure, content providers have a 
substantial collective incentive to increase adoption rates, in order to enjoy a 
larger market for their products. But any particular content provider will 
capture only a small part of the gain from recruiting a new broadband 
consumer, and the content providers, taken as a whole, will face a tragedy of 
the commons in dividing the total subsidy burden among themselves. Here the 
access provider may play a useful role by orchestrating the contributions of the 
different content providers. 
A consumer subsidy strategy has plenty of precedents where markets are 
“two-sided”—that is, where a firm enables interactions between different types 
of end users.
147 A difficult challenge in such markets is to set prices to attract 
both sides to the table. A common strategy is to combine high prices toward 
144 See O RGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC  CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,  OECD 
BROADBAND  STATISTICS TO DECEMBER  2006 (2007), http://www.oecd.org/document/7/ 
0,3343,en_2649_34225_38446855_1_1_1_1,00.html (reporting, as of December 2006, 19.6 connections 
per 100 people in the United States and 31.9 in Denmark). If the figures are normalized by household, 
the overall U.S. ranking is little changed. One calculation, using June 2006 OECD data, places the 
United States twelfth on both a per capita and a per household basis. See Digital Future of the United 
States: Part IV: Broadband Lessons from Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Telecommunications and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 17 tbl.2 
(2007) (testimony of George S. Ford). 
145 For an argument along similar lines, see Sidak, supra note 48, at 462 (noting that if end 
users pay the full cost of access, some consumers will be excluded). 
146 E.g., Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 118, at 298 (concluding that “[p]reserving 
Internet spillovers requires preserving network neutrality”). 




one side of the market with subsidization of the other.
148 Game console makers 
offer the console at a loss
149 but earn profits from royalties paid by 
developers;
150 credit card payment systems charge merchants but subsidize 
consumers in the form of cash or frequent flyer miles; women pay less than 
men to enter certain nightclubs.
151 Internet service provider NetZero adopted 
the same plan when it offered free dial-up Internet access to consumers but 
required them to watch advertising.
152 Google does the same when it charges 
advertisers but not users of its search engine. 
The lack of a zero-price restriction upon the pricing behavior of credit 
card payment systems, video game consoles, and other platform providers 
promotes widespread adoption of each technology. Where, as with broadband 
service, an access charge for content providers is not likely to be entirely 
passed on by content providers to the customer,
153 a zero-price rule can have an 
inhibitory effect upon adoption. That is not to say that a zero-price rule is 
necessarily inimical to broadband access. The present point is simply that a 
zero-price rule is not essential to a robust broadband access policy. 
D.  Contracting into Decentralized Innovation 
Resting the argument for a broad-based zero-price rule on extraction 
concerns encounters a further problem. Advocates of zero-price regulation 
rightly emphasize the value and importance of decentralized content 
innovation. But there is reason to expect that even if access providers have a 
measure of control over the path of complementary content innovation,
154 they 
will use that control to promote decentralized innovation. By “contracting into” 
decentralized innovation,
155 an access provider will implement, as a private 
148 Id. at 659 (noting, as examples, giving away Acrobat reader to make money from writers, 
giving away newspapers to increase advertising, and below-cost video game consoles). 
149 See, e.g., Press Release, iSuppli, PlayStation 3 Offers Supercomputer Performance at PC 
Pricing (Nov. 16, 2006), available at  http://www.isuppli.com/news/default.asp?id=6919 (reporting 
result of teardown analysis of PlayStation 3 game console). The premium model of the console has an 
estimated materials cost of $840 and a suggested retail price of $599. The basic model has an even wider 
discrepancy. 
150 DAVID  S.  EVANS  ET AL., INVISIBLE  ENGINES:  HOW  SOFTWARE  PLATFORMS  DRIVE 
INNOVATION AND TRANSFORM INDUSTRIES 135 (2006) (reporting $7 per unit royalty for Xbox games 
made by third parties). 
151 Lauren Collins, On the Docket: Hey, La-a-a-dies!, NEW YORKER, Aug. 6, 2007, at 22 
(describing equal protection challenge to lower admission fees for women at New York clubs). 
152 NetZero later moved to a user fee-based structure. 
153 If the access charge to the content provider is passed through entirely to the customer, 
then the policy has no effect on adoption. 
154 As opposed to content that competes with a legacy business, as discussed supra in Section 
II.B. 
155 Cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private and 
Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007 (2003); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: 
Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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matter, the same basic arrangement that zero-price advocates seek through 
government intervention. 
The flourishing of attractive content is in an access provider’s interest 
because it raises the surplus that can be extracted by the access provider. One 
option is for an access provider to attempt to make attractive content on its 
own. This strategy is likely to fail because innovative content ideas are widely 
dispersed.
156 Someone will invent PageRank,
157 but any particular access 
provider is unlikely to come up with that innovation even if it exerts 
considerable effort. A large incumbent may find it particularly difficult to 
develop innovative content in-house. Its culture may resist new approaches, and 
its relatively flat pay structure makes it difficult to provide large rewards to 
financially motivated individual innovators. The problem is worsened if the 
access provider is an incompetent steward and exercises control in an irrational 
or arbitrary way.
158 
The dispersed nature of innovation implies the failure of in-house content 
production. Decentralization is necessary. But it does not follow that 
government-mandated  decentralization will increase the production of 
innovative content. Even if a content provider lacks a regulatory entitlement to 
retain a certain level of rewards from its innovation, the access provider has a 
strong incentive to furnish those rewards. Where the interests of the access 
provider and the content provider can be aligned in this fashion, the initial 
distribution of regulatory entitlements does not matter. This is a familiar 
argument, essentially the Coase theorem in a dynamic setting,
159 well captured 
by the explicitly Coasean analysis of Owen and Rosston
160 and the 
“internalizing complementary efficiencies” baseline described by Farrell and 
Weiser.
161 
There are theoretical reasons to think that the dynamic Coase theorem 
does not always hold. For example, a content provider might worry that once it 
sinks the costs of application development, it will be subject to “holdup,” or 
expropriation of its profits by the access provider. The holdup problem is not 
156 For an introduction, see SCOTCHMER,  supra note 120 (collecting and evaluating 
literature); Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1473 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2008). 
157 PageRank, the “heart” of Google search software, “relies on the uniquely democratic 
nature of the web by using its vast link structure as an indicator of an individual page’s value.” Google 
Technology, http://www.google.com/technology (last visited Apr. 18, 2008); see also Sergey Brin & 
Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 30 COMPUTER 
NETWORKS & ISDN SYS. 107 (1998) (describing PageRank). 
158 Farrell & Weiser, supra note 43, at 114-17. 
159 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules—
A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1968) (acknowledging applicability of Coase theorem to dynamic 
entry decisions). 
160 See Owen & Rosston, supra note 50, at 167-68 (suggesting utility of Coasean 
perspective). 
161 Farrell & Weiser, supra note 43; cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the 




limited to content providers. For example, an access provider’s investment in 
capacity makes later content development possible. When it comes time to 
divide the surplus jointly created by the new capacity and the new content, the 
access provider’s previously sunk costs are not part of the bargain.
162  This 
dilemma of sequential innovation creates a significant difficulty for access 
providers—for example, Verizon, during its continuing fiber-to-the-home 
rollout
163—seeking to recover fixed costs expended to develop a joint 
innovation.
164 A zero-price rule worsens that cost recovery problem. 
How well do access providers contract into decentralized innovation? 
Direct evidence on this question is lacking.
165 The technical ability of an access 
provider to engage in extraction is only now emerging, and so we lack a track 
record of negotiations between access providers and content providers 
succeeding or failing. It has not been established, moreover, whether an access 
provider can simply precommit to a menu of charges that varies depending 
upon the size and success of the content provider, a step that would reduce the 
holdup problem. The absence of direct evidence is a reason to resist ambitious 
regulation, such as a zero-price rule. 
Evidence from other industries suggests that the hold-up problem is not 
severe. Recall, for example, the video game developer’s royalty payments to 
the console maker.
166 Movie studios use a variety of contractual instruments to 
coordinate sequential investments by writers, producers, and actors.
167 
Codevelopment relationships ameliorate, as a practical matter, the theoretical 
effect of holdup in automobile manufacturing
168 and other industries.
169 Some 
162 For example, suppose that the access provider makes a capacity investment at a cost of 10, 
and then a content provider develops innovative content, possible only as a consequence of the earlier 
capacity investment, at a cost of 5. The benefit created by the two investments is 20. The access provider 
can anticipate the size of this benefit but not its source. If the two bargain after all costs are sunk, and the 
two divide the gain evenly, each receives 10, and the investment will proceed. If the access provider’s 
costs are slightly higher, then the access provider will not invest in the first place, and the socially 
valuable innovation will not be produced. Note that if the content provider can be identified prior to the 
access provider’s investment, the problem is reduced, for in that case the access provider will insist that 
the content provider help cover those costs. 
163 Arshad Mohammed, Verizon Lays It on the Line: CEO Sticks By Costly Rollout of Fiber-
Optic Network, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2006, at D1. 
164 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 120, at 135-40. 
165 For a recent statement emphasizing the absence of demonstrated harm, see Ex Parte 
Filing, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, In re Broadband Industry Practices, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894 (Apr. 16, 2007) (No. 
07-52), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/comments/225767.pdf. 
166 Console makers employ a mix of “make” and “buy” strategies. Sony and Microsoft have 
worked with outside vendors for the most part. Nintendo has made games on its own, though this is 
changing. Martin Fackler, Putting the We Back in Wii, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at BC1. Some games 
are made for multiple consoles, while others are exclusive to one console. 
167 See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, The Net Profits Puzzle, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 524 (1997). 
168 Susan Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling 
Opportunism, 9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 443 (2000). Automobile manufacturing is the source of the 
most famous case of holdup in the literature, the negotiations between General Motors and a key 
supplier, Fisher Body. Whether that example actually reflects hold-up is subject to doubt. See Ronald 
Coase, The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors, 15 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRATEGY 255 (2006). ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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firms, such as Intel, promote complementary innovation by making clear 
commitments to preserve the profitability of complementary markets.
170 A 
practically-minded literature provides advice about how best to “procure 
innovation” from outside suppliers.
171 
There are counterexamples, in which privately arranged decentralization 
has failed. For example, only after the Carterfone decision, and the 
accompanying reduction in AT&T’s control of innovations complementary to 
ordinary telephone service, did applications such as modems and fax machines 
emerge. There exist historical examples in which a single firm with broad 
patent protection has controlled an industry, and proved to be a poor 
orchestrator of later improvements.
172 The relevance of these counterexamples 
is limited by a common feature, the presence of a single dominant firm with 
control over an industry.
173 (Nor do all dominant firms threaten complementary 
innovation, as the Intel counterexample demonstrates.) In broadband access 
provision, by contrast, no single firm has anything like that level of control. No 
provider has a U.S. market share larger than 25 percent, and most have much 
less. The relative unimportance of each access provider increases the 
competitive pressure to make good decisions about complementary innovation, 
and reduces the likelihood that any single provider’s suboptimal decision will 
have an adverse effect.
174 
IV. Conclusion 
The merits of a zero-price rule that protects content providers generally 
cannot be sustained. Exclusion concerns are addressed by antitrust law, with 
the caveats noted in Part II. Extraction grounds fail to justify zero-price 
regulation for the reasons discussed in Part III, including substitution to indirect 
169 See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Neither Modularity or Relational Contracting: 
Inter-Firm Collaboration in the New Economy, 5 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 388 (2004) (discussing “the 
profusion of innovative disciplines and practices of co-design such as simultaneous engineering, 
benchmarking, co-location of personnel, problem-solving teams, processual quality standards, and the 
like”). 
170 See Gawer & Henderson, supra note 5 (providing detailed account of Intel’s efforts to 
preserve innovation in complementary markets). 
171 Luis Cabral et al., Procuring Innovations, in HANDBOOK OF PROCUREMENT 483 (Nicola 
Dimitri et al. eds., 2006) (suggesting principles for purchase of innovative goods by public and private 
entities). 
172 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (offering examples from electrical lighting, automobile, airplane, and 
radio industries). 
173 In addition, some really amount to anticompetitive suppression of substitutes rather than 
poor strategy in the promotion of complements. 
174 Cf. Bresnahan & Greenstein, supra note 5 (making a similar point in the context of 
“divided technical leadership”). Indeed, an access provider’s decision might well have no substantial 
effect, due to fragmentation among access providers, an effect discussed supra in Subsection II.B.1. If a 
content provider can achieve scale without access to a particular access provider’s customers, the access 




extraction, the availability of nonfinancial rewards for content innovation, the 
virtues of an extraction-reliant strategy for increasing broadband adoption (and, 
as many have noted, for encouraging infrastructure development), and the 
absence of evidence that privately negotiated decentralization is infeasible. 
This Article’s typology of exclusion and extraction, and accompanying 
analysis of each strategy, are useful tools to assess other claims that a powerful 
firm has the ability and incentive to limit competition and innovation. Consider, 
for example, Google, currently the most powerful content provider. The 
incentives of content providers have been neglected, compared to the extensive 
recent scrutiny of access providers. A shift in attention is appropriate in part 
because, as explained in Part II, exclusion of a content provider, an important 
focus of network neutrality proposals, is of primary benefit to a rival content 
provider. 
Google is a major infrastructural resource, and possessed of the major 
features that have traditionally given rise to common carrier regulation. 
Moreover, Google’s bargaining position does not suffer from the market 
fragmentation that besets an individual access provider, making it a more likely 
extractor than AT&T or Comcast, extraction that could be undertaken with 
respect to access providers or complementary content businesses. 
As for exclusion, a risk arises where a complementary content business 
has a contractual or ownership relationship to Google’s core search business, 
and there are incentives to favor that content over rivals in Google’s search 
results. A full analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but as analysts of 
network neutrality turn toward the analogous question of search neutrality, 
three lessons from Part II are particularly relevant. 
First, the degree of ownership matters. Anticompetitive favoritism is 
rendered less visible and less amenable to antitrust enforcement when it is 
masked within the firm. Google’s steady accretion of content affiliates, such as 
YouTube, and news, maps, and financial information, provides a greater 
opportunity for anticompetitive favoritism. The effect of ownership is 
compounded by a second factor, the technology of favoritism. Network 
neutrality concerns have become more important as the technology of traffic 
differentiation has improved. Search neutrality will become more important as 
search results become easier to manipulate—for example, with “universal 
search,” in which Google’s familiar list of ten blue links is augmented with 
information from its affiliates.
175 As PageRank cedes ground to Google’s own 
editorial choices, the opportunity for favoritism increases. 
Third, social production is particularly vulnerable when rival content 
offers a superior mechanism for extraction, and alternative mechanisms for 
175 comScore reported that during a one-week sample period in January 2008, 17 percent of 
Google results included universal search, and more than half of users saw a universal search result. 
Kevin Ryan, Uncovering the Real Universal Search, SEARCH  ENGINE  WATCH, Mar. 19, 2008, 
http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage.html?page=3628796. ZPR 4-21-08 REG-MARKETS.DOC 4/23/2008  5:18:06 PM 
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collecting surplus (such as charging consumers) are unavailable. As an 
example, consider Google’s newest content affiliate, Knol, still under 
development as of April 2008.
176 Knol is a proposed for-profit alternative to 
Wikipedia, in which authors and Google share advertising dollars. Knol gives 
Google a revenue stream that it misses out on when consumers use Wikipedia 
instead. As a consequence, Google has an incentive to steer traffic to Knol, 
even if users prefer Wikipedia.
177 The resulting decrease in Wikipedia traffic 
might reduce participation in, and hence the quality of, Wikipedia.
178 
Whether anything comes of the Knol initiative, Google’s foray does 
suggest that the “Wikipedia gap” discussed in Part II is not merely theoretical. 
Nevertheless, even though the narrower case of socially produced content 
presents a relatively stronger argument for regulation, implementing such 
regulation in practice requires a better understanding of the circumstances 
under which alternative mechanisms protect social production. For example, as 
explained in Part II, effective price discrimination among consumers makes 
regulatory protection unnecessary, by providing an alternative mechanism by 
which an access provider can harvest the available surplus, rather than 
excluding social production. Moreover, other complementors of the socially 
produced content may be able to engage in counterstrategies that reduce the 
utility of regulation. 
The vulnerability of social production is a general issue. It recurs, for 
example, in the ongoing high-stakes battle between Linux and Microsoft. 
Microsoft, a market producer, has secured patents pertaining to operating 
system functionality that Linux might infringe.
179 Linux, the product of social 
production, has not secured a comparable patent portfolio to threaten Microsoft. 
This has created a potential strategic disadvantage for Linux, in which it is 
unable to enforce mutual deterrence with Microsoft.
180 Extending the familiar 
analogy of nuclear deterrence, in which patentholders engage in mutual 
abeyance, rather than launching patent infringement suits, the question is 
176 Posting of Udi Manber, VP Engineering, to Official Google Blog, 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/12/encouraging-people-to-contribute.html (Dec. 13, 2007, 
18:01:00 EST). 
177 See Nate Anderson, Google to Wikipedia: “Knol” Thine Enemy, ARS TECHNICA, Dec. 14, 
2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071214-google-to-wikipedia-knol-thine-enemy.html 
(“[I]t’s clear that Google really wants to be in control . . . . [a]nd it can offer something that Wikipedia, 
et al., cannot: cash.”). Interestingly, Google might have an incentive to privilege its affiliate even if this 
incentive is missing, because the popularity of Knol results are easier to measure. Cf. Danny Sullivan, 
Google Knol—Google’s Play to Aggregate Knowledge Pages, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, Dec. 13, 2007, 
http://searchengineland.com/071213-213400.php. 
178  Posting of Duncan Riley to TechCrunch, http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/12/14/google-
knol-a-step-too-far (Dec. 14, 2007) (describing Knol as “direct challenge to Wikipedia” and arguing that 
“[i]f Wikipedia is replaced in the first few results on Google with pages from Knol, Wikipedia traffic 
will decrease, and possibly as a consequence so will broader participation on Wikipedia”). 
179 Daisuke Wakabayashi & Jim Finkle, Microsoft Says Open Source Violates 235 Patents, 
REUTERS, May 15, 2007 (reporting Microsoft’s contention that open-source software violates 235 
company patents and intention to seek licensing fees). 




whether and when a well-equipped ally will commit to extend its protective 
umbrella.
181 This Article provides a first step toward a better understanding of 
the strategic interaction between social production and market production. 
Identifying the extent and availability of credible counterstrategies is a 
promising area for future research. 
181 Matthew Broersma, Google Joins Open-Source Patent Network, ZDNET NEWS, Aug. 8, 
2007, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-6201407.html; Martyn Williams, IBM, Sony, Red Hat Join 
Others in Linux Patent Venture, INFOWORLD, Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.infoworld.com/article/ 
05/11/10/HNlinuxpatent_1.html. 